Kriterion is a journal housed at The Federal University of Minas Gerais, Department of Philosophy. It was first published in 1947, being the oldest in the area in Brazil. It aims at publishing high quality original research in Philosophy. Kriterion is published three times a year. The journal is indexed by the Philosopher´s Index (EUA), MLA International Bibliography (EUA), Bibliographie de la Philosophie (Louvain, Bélgica), EBSCO (Massachusetts, EUA), SciELO (Latin America), Scopus/Elsevier (Holland), Web of Science, DOAJ, Latindex, CCN/IBICT (Brazil) Pergamum (Brazil). The journal has achieved the highest ranking in the Brazilian QUALIS/CAPES committee: A1.
O IDEAL DE RAÇA NA TERCEIRA CRÍTICA KANTIANA E SUAS IMPLICAÇÕES PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO RACISMO CULTURAL
Este artigo parte de uma reconsideração crítica da estética kantiana, sob a perspectiva da radicalização dos corpos, tendo em vista a emergência paralela da estética e da antropologia no século XVIII. Ambas as áreas tiveram seu desenvolvimento abertamente implicado, embora não seja comum levar em conta o impacto de uma sobre a outra na perspectiva da investigação filosófica. Portanto, quando a Crítica da Faculdade do Juízo surge como tema inicial deste artigo, objetiva-se discutir a influência do pensamento ainda incipiente da teoria das raças sobre o juízo estético kantiano, numa interlocução com Ape to Apolo: Aesthetics and the Idea of Race in the 18th Century, de David Bindman, para, em seguida, dimensionar o alcance da estética kantiana no ajuizamento de construtos culturais não europeus, a partir da leitura crítica de Roger Somé em Le concept d’‘esthétique africaine’: essai d’une généalogie critique. Esses dois momentos resultam no questionamento sobre a universalidade das categorias estéticas clássicas, evidenciando a cumplicidade do pensamento filosófico europeu para o desenvolvimento do racismo cultural.
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DESCARTES ON THE ROLE OF DIAGRAMS AND SYMBOLS IN MATHEMATICS
Descartes seems to have held to the end of his life that imagination plays a prominent role in mathematics. In distinguishing sharply between images and ideas in the Meditations, he is adamant in stating that we do not need images in order to have mathematical ideas, and that there is a purely intellectual conception of extension and even presumably extended objects, existing or not. However, he seems to advocate that imagination does make these ideas better. The main goal of the present paper is to analyze, specially by means of Rules XIV-XVI and the Discourse on Method, how this auxiliary role played by imagination can be found in the use of diagrams and mathematical symbolism as an aid for mathematical invention. As I will argue, while Descartes seems to have thought that (ordinary) language is a source of error, prejudice, and obscurity, he also thought that a good use of signs in mathematics provides our ideas with distinctness, as also would the remote possibility of an idealized universal philosophical language.
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE E O TEATRO DE SITUAÇÕES
This paper analyzes aspects of the theatre of situations as presented by Jean-Paul Sartre. It differentiate Sartre's dramaturgy from the theater of situations, because the analysis of his theater works requires case-by-case examination, while the aesthetics of theater reaches other authors and contexts. To examine his aesthetic theory, it is necessary to expand the bibliographic sources, analyzing the considerations about the theater throughout his work. We turn to the collection "A theatre of situations" (organized by Michel Contat), which provides a thematic overview. Sartre's aesthetic theory cannot be separated from philosophical concepts and must be seen in an integrated way, at the risk of epistemological damage. Theater must be seen from the perspective of Sartre's philosophical project and his contribution to existentialism. It is a form of engagement and, like other forms of expression (literature, philosophy and literary criticism), it manifests itself as a spokesperson for freedom. Considering Sartre's aesthetic theory of the theater, other concepts will be presented, coming from "Being and Nothingness" (concept of negativity), "The Family Idiot" (concept of universal-singular), "What is literature?" (concept of appeal) and "The Imaginary" (concept of análogon). The end of the essay analyzes the concept of the actor. Theater requires the identification of the spectator with the characters. Like the actor, characterized by the phenomenon of self-denial and identification with the other, the spectator is confronted with the negativity of the human condition.
This article sought to provide a new interpretation of Adam Smith’s view about moral luck. In his work Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith diagnosed the influence of luck on our moral sentiments, he named this phenomenon by “irregularity of sentiments”. Given the proximity between Smith’s analysis of this irregularity of sentiments and the debate on moral luck, some philosophers have attempted to shed more light on his position on moral luck. I defend that these previous interpretations fail to notice the real connection between the virtue of justice and the irregularity of moral sentiments. As I intend to argue, this connection gives us the proper tools to better understand Smith’s position in the debate.
After the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971, John Rawls was often read as an advocate of a more moderate type of capitalism. However, authors such as DiQuattro, Krouse and McPherson have argued that Rawlsian theory cannot be seen as an advocacy of the capitalist regime. DiQuattro first, followed by Krouse and McPherson, argued that Rawls was an advocate of Property-Owning Democracy. Rawls, in later works, most notably Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (published in 2001), acknowledged defending the Property-Owning Democracy. But what would Property-Owning Democracy be? The aim of this paper is precisely to present the history of the concept, highlighting the fact that it emerged in the cradle of the British Conservative Party and later entered the ranks of the Labour Party through the revisionists. It is in this context that we will research the economist James Meade's defense of Property-Owning Democracy, which Rawls recognizes as his inspiration. The differences between Rawlsian thought and that defended by Meade will also be explored, with special emphasis on the fact that, in the British economist's view, there is a defense of Property-Owning Democracy as an alternative for capitalism (e.g., aiming to improve and correct the capitalist regime), while for the American philosopher it is presented from the perspective of an alternative to capitalism (in the sense of replacing and overcoming it).
The Paradox of morality in constitutional legal reasoning
This article aims to stipulate an as yet unidentified paradox in constitutional reasoning: I have called it the morality paradox (and its effects) in constitutional legal reasoning and the challenges facing the constitutional rule of law. I identify it as a constitutive feature of modern constitutional life and propose an enunciation of the paradox and its main paradoxical effects. Finally, I propose a re-reading of the metaphor of Ulysses in chains in order to understand this paradox and identify ways to deal with it.
ARE THE SIMPLEST BODIES AND THE SUBSTANCE INDIVIDUALS IN SPINOZA’S PHILOSOPHY?
The present article analyzes the notions of simplest bodies and substance in the light of the definition of individual as presented in the physical digression of the second part of Spinoza's Ethics. Our goal is to clarify the relationship between the notions of individual, simplest bodies and substance. Our hypothesis is that neither the simplest bodies nor the substance can be considered individuals. In order to do this, the work will be divided into two parts: the first one concerns the approach of the simplest bodies, the second, the approach of substance. At the end, final considerations will be outlined.
This essay argues for an interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of conscience (Gewissen) based on a phenomenological reconstruction of its characteristics, as indicated by texts in which Nietzsche attempts to describe experiences related to conscience. From this point of view, conscience plays an essentially cognitive role, in the sense of being an opening to a dimension of preconscious experiences, especially listening, strangeness, love, freedom and time, that yield epistemological and ontological value. These varied experiences reveal conscience as constituted by a myriad of nuances rooted in three basic modes, corresponding to the threefold typology of the slave, the noble and the priest. They also form the basis for a consideration of the role of consciousness (Bewusstsein) in cognition, as the modalities of conscience mobilize human intellectual capability according to different measures and limits. Lastly, the analysis of conscience provides a foundation for a phenomenological reconstruction of the concept of will to power, characterized primarily by the possibility of human freedom in the face of the power of time and secondarily by the potential for an analogical application of the concept as a heuristic principle of calculability.
RHETORIC OF NAMES ANDSPRACHE IN WALTER BENJAMIN
The present work proposes to analyze the rhetoric of names in the text “On language as such and on the language of man”. Based on this, through a way of expository interpretation, we will address how Walter Benjamin's rhetorical use of theological figures is elaborated in its conception of speech (Sprache) as lógos, the status of its unconditional character and the unspeakable. For this task, we will expose the constitutive incompatibility between the category of name (as an element of analysis of the rhetoric instance of speech) and the category of sign (which, in its instrumental characterization, is reduced to a logical-mathematical unit of analysis). The exposition of these moments will be the starting point from which we will arrive at the following final considerations: that constitutive incompatibility allows us to think about the peculiar paradoxical character on which speech is founded.
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A PROBLEMATIC MEREOLOGICAL ANALYSIS: TRANSITIVITY IMPLIES IDENTITY
In the present research, it is argued that two different mereological theories incur in the problem according to which the transitivity of proper parthood relation implies identity. The mereological theories are: (i) Kathrin Koslicki's theory presented in her work The Structure of Objects (2008) and (ii) the theory according to which Tractarian propositions are analyzed as mereological wholes in the context of Edmund Husserl's theory of wholes and parts. The main objective is to demonstrate that, in formal terms, any mereological analysis that accepts that transitivity implies identity is inconsistent, and also presents certain specific problems that arise for each of the mentioned theories.
The article examines some aspects of the formation of Theodor W. Adorno’s concept of theory and argues that its foundation lies in the interpretation of exchange as a principle of autonomization of society. To this end, on the one hand, it articulates the concept with Hans-Georg Backhaus’ and Helmut Reichelt’s interpretation of the Marxian value theory, with which, on the other hand, Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s notion of real abstraction is contrasted. It argues that interpretation, by recovering the category of capital, clarifies and grounds the concept of theory in Adorno’s social thought. On the basis of these considerations, the article raises a hypothesis about the meaning theory can have in the contemporary debate.
In Kant's work the term value is used with great frequency and in fact it is not exclusive to the works of moral philosophy. Despite this fact, Kant has neither clearly nor sufficiently explained what this concept really means in his moral philosophy. In this paper I shall argue that Kant’s concept of value in the first Section of Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals is relevant and strategical for clarifying his notion of moral action, but it plays just a secondary role in the whole argumentation of the Groundwork. This is the main reason why his ethics is not properly what we call a systematic theory of moral value. As we will see his concept of value is not placed before, upon or, maybe under that is, as the foundation of the validity of the moral law and of duty, but, on the contrary, it derives from the moral law and the categorical imperative.
This paper intends to analyze Walter Benjamin’s critique of Heidegger’s habilitation thesis Duns Scotus’s Doctrine of Categories and Meaning. This objective will be carried out from a contrast between Heidegger’s thesis and the essay that Benjamin writes at the same time entitled On Language as Such and on the Language of Man. Likewise, the reasons that lead Benjamin to critically comment on Heidegger’s thesis will be studied from two perspectives: the problem of translation and the Heideggerian recovery of Neo-Kantianism. Considering the rehabilitation of scholasticism and phenomenology at the beginning of the 20th century, an attempt will be made to reconstruct an implicit debate between the authors around 1916 to account for the distance between Heidegger’s logical conception of language and Benjamin’s theological conception of language.
The aesthetics of the young Herder and the Sturm und Drang
Johann Gottfried Herder was an indispensable thinker for Aesthetics and Theory of Literature in the mid-18th century, influencing directly and indirectly generations of writers and thinkers. Having written in several areas, from the philosophy of language to the philosophy of history, his thought is characterized by a refusal to theories that sought to find general foundations for artistic appreciation. His contribution was made through the valorization of the particular elements of art, such as culture and language, and also through the introduction of the concept of empathy [Einfühlung] as a form of cognition. His rejection of the generalist French rationalism paved the way for the Sturm und Drang and left a very strong mark on early German Romanticism, especially Friedrich Schlegel.
“I SPEAK ONLY ONE LANGUAGE AND IT ISNOT MINE”
The article reflects on the theme of colonization in Derrida present in The Monolingualism of the Other. The aim is to show how the modern humanist colonial project is reflected in the language, imposing an ethnocentric dimension. The aim is, initially, after presenting the idea of an essential colonization intrinsic to language, to elucidate what Derrida considers as a quasi-transcendental structure of language given by the game between the aneconomic element of untranslatability and the economic element of intertranslatability, of where a universal character of language and the need to think about it ethically and politically through the idea of language to come, pointed out by the aforementioned philosopher, are extracted. Secondly, we will address Derrida’s notion of the future (avenir), briefly relating it to three ideas with which it appears associated: 1. Democracy to come, 2. Messianism and 3. Hospitality, with the aim of better understanding the meaning which the deconstructor attributes to the language to come. Finally, we draw the following conclusion: the possibility of thinking about the quasi-concept of language and writing in Derrida as a means to magnetize a language to come.
QUENTIN SKINNER’SINTERPRETATION OF MONTAIGNE’S«MACHIAVELLIAN DOCTRINE»AND STOICISM
The aim of this paper is to critically consider Quentin Skinner's reading, presented in The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, of Montaigne's work, in particular the essay "De l'utile et de l'honneste". The Cambridge University professor places Montaigne in a philosophical matrix that includes both the "Machiavellian doctrine", supposedly linked to the discourse of reason of state, and the political ideology of the Stoics and Neo-Stoics. We try to demonstrate the fragility of this thesis by pointing out, firstly, Montaigne's recognition of the virtue of the principles of Machiavelli's thought, which is not confused with the doctrines of Machiavellianism and reason of state, which he rejects; and, secondly, the different approach of Machiavelli and Montaigne to the relationship between ethics and politics. As for the Stoics, characterised by the author for their resignation in the face of "public death", the text moves in the direction of pointing out that this is not a trait attributable to the Stoics as a whole, much less to Montaigne. In the end, we present a reading of the essay in order to highlight details that reinforce the fact that Montaigne cannot be affiliated, as Skinner does, either with the doctrine of Machiavellianism and reason of state, or with Stoicism or neo-Stoicism.
Pacifism and just war theory share the same binary approach to analyze the morality of war. According to binarism, any war is either morally justified or morally unjustified and when waging a war is morally unjustified, not waging that war is morally justified. Moral tragedy pacifism, advocated by Nicholas Parkin, argues that while waging war is always morally unjustified, on some occasions not waging war may also be morally unjustified. On those occasions, agents face a moral tragedy, in which there is no morally justified choice all things considered. In this essay, I present three arguments against moral tragedy pacifism and indirectly in favor of binarism.
In this article I propose an analysis of John Buridan's approach to demonstrations by reductio ad impossibilem, or indirect demonstrations. In distinction to categorical demonstrations, indirect demonstrations involve a conditional with an impossible antecedent. Central to the article is the problem of how Buridan’s analysis of indirect demonstrations relates to his notorious commitment to the ex impossibili quodlibet (EIQ) principle, as spelled out in his Tractatus de Consequentiis. The first two sections of the article (1-2) describe how Buridan approaches the inferential principles of indirect demonstrations, placing them in the context of his theory of logical consequence. In the remaining two sections (3-4), I investigate some key applications of this form of demonstration in Buridan’s commentary on the seventh book of Physics. The paper concludes that the distinction between counterpossibles about absolute impossibilities and counterpossibles about nomic impossibilities is central for the use of indirect demonstrations in Buridan’s sense.
The article seeks to present three criteria that could serve as indications for a test of the best theory of law, positivism or jusnaturalism. Considering that the crux of the matter is the relationship between law and morality, and that positivists generally defend the separation thesis, and that jusnatralists defend the connection thesis, the text scrutinizes the possible effects that the two conceptions have in relation to quietism, anarchy and the retroactivity of the law. It therefore deals with the relationship between legal positivism and jusnaturalism with wicked legal systems, especially Nazism. The text scrutinizes the Hart/Fuller debate in order to analyze the possible causal relatioships that would explain the connections between legal positivism and jusnaturalism with Nazism. It indicates that a similar debate could be reconstructed between Kelsen/Radbruch. The article argues that in terms of quietism, both theories are as if in a tie. For this reason, the search for possible effects was extended to other questions, such as the thesis of anarchy and complexity. In these last two areas, the article concludes that legal positivism has a slight advantage over jusnaturalism.
AUCTORITAS, DECOR AND RATIOMEDIOCRITATIS
During the 15th century, pontiffs, secular lords and men of power from Italy, absorbed in the desire to restore a dignity that long time ago characterized ancient Rome, identified the liberal arts as instruments of political legitimation. However, they had a territorial and financial disposition so much narrower than that of previous empires. In this context, Leon Battista Alberti, envisioning to incite building’s investments and fruitful patronage relationships with architects, identifies in ancient values the key to this complex issue: the valuation of architecture as a major art. In his De Re Ædficatoria the humanist prescribes the excellence of art based on concinnitas which permeates the ratio mediocritas and approaches the Vitruvian precepts of decor and symmetria described in De Architectura. Therefore, this paper proposes to understand how the ancient writer and the humanist, each in their own way, demonstrate that the excellent value of art achieved through sollertia ingenium guided by doctrinal reflection exceeds the vulgar preciousness of sumptuous investments. Thus, conferring auctoritas to constructions that show dignitas and honestas in the visual recognition of the image of good government, even using parsimonious investments.
In his two main essays on epic theater, Benjamin suggests that the antitragic element of Brechtian theater can be read as a kind of heritage of the Socratic attitude and the Platonic dialogue, transmitted in a "secret and sneaky" way by martyr drama, French classical tragedy, and Trauerspiel.
Some contemporary scholars of Marx and Engels’ works have done well to draw attention to the peculiarity of their use of the concept “ideology” as an “inversion of the relationship between thought process and lived existence”. This use appears with crucial precision in Marx and Engels’ critiques of “post-Hegelianism” and “true socialism”. However, it is often difficult to understand in any level of detail what this supposed “inversion” means. I intend to provide a non-exhaustive, but nevertheless more assertive and specific explanation of the supposed “inversion” in this text. This is merely a reframing of “ideology” in order to situate and contextualize Marx and Engels’ use of the term against the backdrop of their discussions about the limits of philosophical activity. For this reason, my explanation takes the relationship between the terms “philosophy” and “practice” (sections 2, 3 and 4) as the explanatory axis for the use of the concept “ideology”. I also try to distinguish two moments in the appearance of the concept “ideology”: (i) two analytical steps or typical notes that the expression “active conceptual ideologues” contains; (ii) the philosophical, normative and irreflexively acritical nature of the attempt to solve the “real problems of life” implied in “ideology” (sections 5 and 6). The text’s intended contribution is to show that the concept of “ideology” aims to categorize and critique excessively philosophical approaches to both explaining and critiquing social reality. This does not, however, invalidate the use of the term by the Marxist and critical theory traditions.
The aim of this article is to propose an understanding of Hegel’s aesthetics in terms of its relationship with traditional aesthetics and the aesthetics of his time. In this sense, we highlight the figure of Goethe, both as a creator and critic, and the way in which Hegel rearranges the discourses of art theory, art history and art critique, recovering August Schlegel and Herder’s approaches. Hegel’s aesthetic system reflects this rearrangement in its three parts: on the ideal, the forms and the particular of art.
This essay examines Kant’s concept of the holy will within the context of his ethical framework. Contesting reductive interpretations that may trivialize it as a mere constraint on human freedom, the paper argues that the holy will should be conceptualized primarily as a normative archetype. Rooted in the Kant’s transcendental idealism, this archetype operates as a practical guide that aims to refine and extend our understanding of morality. Contrary to teleological notions of causality, the holy will presents an idealized benchmark against which the moral trajectory of humanity can be assessed. This serves as an ethical aspiration that surmounts the barriers typically erected by sensory desires and worldly concerns. This aspirational ideal not only reinforces the autonomy intrinsic to human nature but also delineates a pathway toward genuine moral improvement. Thus, the holy will is not an unattainable yardstick or a fanciful ideal; it emerges as a normative guideline that both enables moral self-realization and challenges us to achieve a state of authentic virtue. Therefore, this central concept in Kantian ethics acts as a catalyst for a profound shift in human comprehension of its own capacities and limitations within the sphere of moral conduct.
This paper addresses feelings and, specifically, the place of compassion in Kantian practical philosophy. First, it will be determined whether compassion, besides not being a moral motive, can even be regarded as a kind of illness in Kant. Second, it will be established if there is any kind of compassion that is benign "moral health". Third, it will be judged whether it is appropriate to postulate an apathetic society free of compassion as an asymptotic ideal. Fourth, and finally, it will be assessed whether and how compassion can be integrated into Kant's ethical model.
Silence is, undoubtedly, one of the responses to the inexpressible. Nevertheless, if the latter may occur, according to Jankélévitch, in two antipode levels, the sterile inexpressibility (untellable) and the fecund inexpressibility (ineffable), the sorts of silence could be also distinguished according to their belonging to one of those levels. This article intends to examine the examples of silence that can be respectively associated with the prime manifestation of the untellable, death, and to a privileged manifestation of the ineffable, music. Therefore, it will be firstly examined, in the sphere of death, the mutism of the dead person, the emptiness of a philosophy of death, and the silence before the moribund or the corpse. Secondly, it will be analyzed, in the realm of music, silence as a reaction to musical ineffability, silence identified with music itself, and silences that may precede, integrate, and follow a musical composition. The proposed itinerary will enable a discussion on the problem of absolute silence, on the kinship between musical and mystical experiences, on the possible approach between the untellable and the ineffable silences, as well as the qualitative differences among some of the recognized examples of silence.
The aim of this text is to conduct a critical analysis of Theodor Adorno’s approach to psychoanalytic theory, particularly that of Sigmund Freud, focusing on aphorisms 36 to 39 and 42 from “Minima Moralia.” In the first part, we will read the philosopher’s arguments taking into account the strongest aspects in his argumentation. In the second part, we will provide critical points to highlight possible conceptual inaccuracies present in Adorno’s approach. We will try to demonstrate the hypothesis that Adorno’s criticisms disregard three important conceptual aspects of psychoanalytic theory: the unconscious conceived from a systematic point of view, repression differentiated from suppression, and the drive impulse conceived from the dynamics of repression.
In several well-known papers, Ernest Sosa has argued, contrary to the orthodox model of dreaming, that dreaming is like imagining: when I dream that p I have sensory images as if p were the case, and propositionally I imagine that p. In other words, I simulate the experience of p. Under this model, the experience of dreaming is more like that of fiction, and, in Sosa's view, it does not endanger the stability of my perceptual beliefs. My purpose in this contribution is to show that, contrary to what Sosa and others argue, it is not clear that the imagination-based model of dreaming has the anti-skeptical consequences they suppose. Specifically, the cases concerning the cognitive phenomenon of simulation that will be the subject of my consideration will show that there is no immediate reflexive and transparent access to our beliefs that would secure them against the possibility of skeptical scenarios.
A METAFÍSICA DA LIBERDADE PARA A RAZÃO PRÁTICA EM KANT
Kant defende um compatibilismo radical na sua tese da união: necessidade natural e liberdade precisam estar unidas em “uma e mesma ação”. Na Elucidação Crítica da Analítica da segunda Crítica, Kant elabora em termos vinculados à sua distinção transcendental entre fenômenos e coisas em si e ao contexto da discussão histórica da Teodicéia sua metafisica da liberdade para a razão prática. Ela é articulada através da distinção que “se segue” da distinção transcendental, esta entre a causalidade do “ente agente” e da “ação no mundo sensorial”, que preserva a atribuição de ambos, necessidade natural e liberdade, às mesmas coisas, isto é, nossas ações no mundo físico. O que mostro no artigo é que essa distinção crucial exige a concepção das ações como o que fazem agentes que têm “causação de agente” e não como eventos físicos que são ocorridos ou acontecimentos no mundo. O elemento fundamental dessa metafísica da agência é que agentes não causam suas ações, que então não são eventos, porque elas são justamente o causar de eventos, seus efeitos, que encontramos como ocorridos no mundo. Contemporaneamente, uma distinção traçada na filosofia da ação entre o uso transitivo e o uso intransitivo de verbos de ações físicas auxilia a articular o que é central à metafísica da liberdade para a razão prática de Kant.
APPETITE AND THE TRIPARTITION OF THE SOUL IN PLATO’S REPUBLIC
This paper intends to demonstrate how the text of the Plato’s Republic allows us to discuss the status of appetites and the appetitive principle (to epithymetikon) of the soul as different, trying to demonstrate that, when we do not exchange them for one another, the platonic theory of the soul is filled with even greater clarity and enables the reader to have a sharper understanding of the problem of possible psychic unity.