POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS IN PIAUÍ AND INVESTMENT IN SPORT AND LEISURE

Received: 24/12/2017
Accepted: 15/08/2018

Edmilson Santos dos Santos
Universidade Federal do Vale do São Francisco
Petrolina – PE – Brasil

Fernando Augusto Starepravo
Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM)
Maringá – PR – Brasil

ABSTRACT: The participation of municipal governments in investment in sport and leisure is still a less investigated topic and little is known regarding it. As a consequence, there are no information whether having an exclusive sport office would increase investments. For that matter, the present descriptive study aimed to analyze if the political-administrative structure of municipal governments in the state of Piauí had any interference in the per capita investment capacity in the Sports and Leisure Function (SLF) in 2013. It was concluded that the political-administrative structure has not interfered in the expense per capita capacity in SLF.


ESTRUTURA POLÍTICO-ADMINISTRATIVA DOS GOVERNOS MUNICIPAIS DO PIAUÍ E INVESTIMENTO NO ESPORTE E NO LAZER

RESUMO: A participação dos governos municipais no investimento do esporte e do lazer é uma temática ainda pouco estudada e pouco se sabe sobre o assunto. Consequentemente, não temos informações se ter uma secretaria exclusiva de esporte aumentaria os investimentos. Nesse sentido, o presente estudo, de natureza descritiva buscou analisar se a estrutura político administrativa das prefeituras municipais do estado do Piauí interfere na capacidade de investimentos na Função Desporto e Lazer (FDL) per capita no ano de 2013. Concluiu-se que a estrutura político administrativa não interferiu na capacidade de gasto per capita na FDL.

Introduction

Over the last decades, there has been a significant growing in analyses of national expenditures that have allowed us to focus on expenses, in a federal sphere, with sport and leisure public policies (CASTRO, 2016; ATAHYDE, 2016; ATHAYDE; MASCARENHAS; SALVADOR, 2015; FIGUEROA et al, 2014; ALMEIDA; MARCHI Jr., 2010; VERONEZ, 2007). Considering the amount of municipalities in Brazil (5,570), this reality lacks more attention by policy communities in the field of sport and leisure public policies. Perhaps part of this lack of attention is related to the low expectation towards the idea of municipalities mobilizing resources in an area in which there are no federal constraints concerning their effective participation in the funding of sport and leisure public policies.

In the article that deals with responsibilities of the municipal public power (Art. 30 in the Federal Constitution of 1988), the sport area has not been pointed as being a municipality attribution. In this case, federal incentives work towards inaction. However, some studies, mostly analyses of the participation of local governments in the implementation of sport and leisure public policies, have demonstrated that policies have been implemented by the municipal public power. Either on the development of its own agenda (bottom-up decentralization), or by implementing the political agenda of the federal government (top-down decentralization) (SABATIER, 1989).

These studies show an intense political activity around the sports agenda in Brazilian municipalities (SANTOS; STAREPRAVO; HIRATA, 2018; BETTIN; PEIL; MELO, 2018; GRASSO; ISAYAMA, 2017; MERTINS; MYSKIW; SANFELICE, 2016; SANTOS, 2016; NASCIMENTO; LAZZAROTTI FILHO; INÁCIO, 2015;
VENTURIM; BORGES; SILVA; COUTO; SANTOS, 2014; LUZ, 2011; BANKOFF; ZAMAI, 2011; BRUST; BAGGIO; SALDANHA FILHO, 2006).

However, there is a deficit regarding studies that place municipalities as the investigative locus to analyze investments on the Sport and Leisure Function (FDL). FDL is the expense unit created by the Brazilian State to assess sport funding (BRASIL, 1999). When analyzing expenses in the FDL by municipalities in Bahia, Santos, Canane e Starepravo (2018) have identified that, despite the constraints towards inaction, municipalities presented a high adhesion to this level of expenditure.

This reality sets as a challenge not only to measure the level of participation of municipalities with expenses in the FDL, but also to understand which intervening variables affect the result.

**Federalism and Sport and Leisure Policies**

Neoinstitutionalist literature places the political-administrative structure of governments management as an important variable to understand the formulation and implementation of public policies in the country’s federalism. Neoinstitutionalism, a current of thought in Social Sciences that strongly emphasizes the importance of institutions to the understanding of social processes, is not characterized as a unitary theoretical current, but it brings closer a great number of researchers who consider institutions as central pieces in the analysis of political and social processes. According to its followers, it is a medium range theory, based on affirmations to be tested and altered from the realization of specific studies (MARQUES, 1996).

The most significant differences between neoinstitutionalism and the other Political Science approaches are related to the explicative feature of political processes
and phenomena. Institutions are identified as independent variables, with explicative capacity about concrete political results and determination about some traces of sociopolitical behavior of individuals and groups (TOMIO, 2003).

Since institutions are a key element to neoinstitutionalism, it is valid to write about their meaning. Marques (1996) makes an analogy using sport to define institutions and social actors, in which actors could be compared to players in a match and institutions are the field boundaries and the game rules. To authors such as Peter Hall (1986), quoted by Marques (1996), institutions incorporate formal rules, consented procedures, operational standardized practices that structure relations between individuals in many units of politics and economy. This concept is not consensual, when other authors come forward, there is a higher level of formality in institutions, that, by resting in legal aspects and a defined structure, distinguish themselves from the norms, whose incentives are more cognitive and social (MARQUES, 1996).

As it is known, the Brazilian state has not delegated obligations for the formulation and implementation of sport and leisure public policies to any federal entity. Despite pointing the right, it has not regulated its fulfilment. Therefore, the key to understanding public policies is associated to what our federalism can offer in terms of incentives to decentralization (MINHOTO, 2014).

This reality is not seen only in sport and leisure policies. Other social policies, non-regulated by norm (state policy), are also dependent on the ruler’s discretionary decisions. In policies of common responsibility (all federal entities may act upon it), what affects the decision capacity are stimuli set by the government so they dispute

---

1 The Federal Constitution of 1988 did not indicate responsibilities regarding the implementation of sport and leisure public policies.
among each other (Art. 24 CF/88) or superior entities’ incentives to cooperation (ALMEIDA, 2005).

A government may offer a policy already implemented by another entity in order to gain the electorate’s interest for developing a more efficient proposal. It may also decrease transaction costs\(^2\) by sharing the action with another federal entity. This way, they are all equally responsible for the policy and can share its political gains.

When there is no chance of imposing a superior entity’s policy agenda on an inferior entity, it is more difficult to accomplish one of the central goals of a federation, indicated on Item 3 from Article 3 in the FC/88. Even though it is necessary to register the sole existence of 3 federal entities (unique among 28 federations), such setting makes the implementation of public policies aiming to reduce inequalities much harder (COSTA, 2010; ARRETCHE; MARQUES, 2007; MARQUES; ARRETCHE, 2003).

On the other hand, from the fiscal point of view, we are the most decentralized federation in the world. We guarantee the contribution of important resources to municipalities without the need of submission to interests of other superior entities (states and Union). First, by assuring municipalities the right to legislate on three taxes: Property Tax (IPTU), Tax on Services of Any Nature (ISQN) and Tax on Transfer of Inter Vivos Goods (ITBI). Second, by guaranteeing a percentage from the Municipality Participation Fund (FPM). Third, by ensuring their share of the Tax on Circulation of Goods and Services (ICMS). Thus, from the fiscal point of view, there are resources for the formulation and implementation of public policies in a local sphere in an anonymous manner (CASTRO et al, 2009), although unevenly distributed in the federation.

\(^2\) Transaction cost relates to how much an entity would have to spend to implement only one specific policy. Since technical formulation until implementation. Having no direct operator at the end, the lowest cost often occurs by offering the policy for another entity to implement.
As there is no equalization in the financial conditions of municipalities, the autonomy of expense tends to promote inequalities in the services offering (ARRETCHE, 2010). Each municipality invests based on what it collects with its own tax regime or with constitutional transfers (FPM and ICMS). Municipalities have been the greatest beneficiaries from the tax decentralization after the Federal Constitution and they have increased significantly their capacity of producing policies (CARNEIRO; ALMEIDA, 2008; SANTOS, 2011). To Arretche (2010), there is an excess of autonomy from local governments, which ends up reducing necessary resources to guarantee more equity in social policies.

As pointed out by Souza (2005), economic differences produce differences in decisive capacity. That way, the capacity of promoting social services, such as sport and leisure policies, is unequal (SOUZA, 2001). Thus, offers that are unequal or different from public policies are characteristic of the Brazilian federalism. The largest equalization in policies can only be achieved with a higher participation of superior entities in the implementation of public policies.

**Materials and Methods**

The present descriptive study aimed to investigate if the political-administrative structure of first-grade municipal governments from the state of Piauí (n = 224) interferes in the capacity of investments in the SLF in the year 2013. In order to accomplish that, the following hypotheses have been established:

H1. Municipal governments that have an exclusive sport and leisure department invest more *per capita* in SLF than those with no such department.

---

3 For a more critical analysis of the post-88 Constitution tax regime, see Santos and Gentil (2009).
H2. Municipal governments that have an exclusive sport and leisure department invest more *per capita* in SLF than those that share the administration with other areas.

Information regarding SLF have been taken from the National Treasury website (https://siconfi.tesouro.gov.br/siconfi/pages/publi) in the section of annual accounts from the Brazilian Public Sector Accounting and Fiscal Information System – Siconfi, between June 10th and 11th, 2016. Data composed a worksheet containing the name of municipalities from Piauí, the organizational structure of municipalities for the implementation of sport and leisure public policies and the cities’ population number, according to the 2010 Census conducted by IBGE.

The organizational structure for implementing sport and leisure public policies has considered 3 scenarios: a) exclusive sport departments (that might include leisure) (Ex); b) sport department working together with other (Ou); c) no first-grade administrative structure (Sem). Information regarding organizational structure have been taken directly from the city governments’ website from October 4th and 12th, 2016.

Population class has been organized in order to consider 4 scenarios: a) CP1, municipalities up to 5 thousand inhabitants; b) CP2, between 5 and 10 thousand inhabitants; c) CP3, between 10,001 and 20 thousand inhabitants; d) CP4, between 20,001 and 50 thousand inhabitants; CP5, over 50 thousand inhabitants.

**Results and Discussion**

Literature about government costs in federalism supports that in discretionary expenses, those non-regulated by norms, there are differences and, sometimes, inequality in the offer of services to the population (ARRETCHE, 2010). As it can be seen in Table 1, *per capita* values of investment in SLF do not vary according to the
city size and higher values take on a descending vector. That is, the increasing on the size of the city reduces the amount of resource available per inhabitant. Otherwise, small municipalities have a bigger quantity of resources per inhabitant for investments in sport and leisure public policies.

Table 1.: Levels of investment *per capita* in SLF per population class in the state of Piauí

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. Mun.</th>
<th>Investment in Sport and Leisure Function</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. SLF</td>
<td>Lowest</td>
<td>Highest</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>&lt;R$ 12,00</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP1</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0,01</td>
<td>80,24</td>
<td>15,30</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP2</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0,07</td>
<td>77,77</td>
<td>10,45</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0,06</td>
<td>46,34</td>
<td>9,44</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0,28</td>
<td>24,02</td>
<td>8,17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0,66</td>
<td>23,22</td>
<td>7,25</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data

The percentage of cities investing less than R$ 1,00/month (R$ 12,00/year) is worth of attention. In Piauí, cities with up to 5 thousand inhabitants manage to invest more than bigger cities. The scenario is quite diverse. Without a measuring system to learn if the investment is short or sufficient given the local population needs, it is not possible to establish fixed parallels between the inequality and, in this case, the difference.

The amount of resources made available for sport and leisure policies by municipalities in Piauí was R$ 22,297,221,46. The investment, only in 2013, stands for 24% of what has been invested in sport and leisure public policies in Piauí by the
Ministry of Sports between 2004 and 2011 (CASTRO, 2016). That means, in one year (2013) municipalities from Piauí have spent the equivalent of one quarter of investments in the state by the Ministry of Sports in 8 years. Investments, per population class, were: CP1: R$ 3,886,758,42; CP2: R$ 5,158,268,70; CP3: R$ 4,652,192,45; CP4: R$ 4,557,214,34; CP5: R$ 4,042,787,55.

The main point of this study was to verify the impact of ways of administrative structures in sport and leisure, in a municipal context, in SLF. As indicated in Table 2, in cities up to 5 thousand inhabitants there was no great variation between administrations that have an exclusive department (Ex) and those that do not have a department (Sem). In this setting, the higher average of investment happens in administrations in which the sports department is shared among other areas (Ou) and it is the one with the lowest percentage of cities investing less than R$ 1,00/month (R$ 12,00/year) in the area (55,56%).

Table 2: Levels of investment *per capita* in SLF per administrative structure and CP1 in the state of Piauí

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. Mun.</th>
<th>Investment in Sport and Leisure Function</th>
<th>No. SLF</th>
<th>Lowest</th>
<th>Highest</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>&lt;R$ 12,00</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ex</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0,20</td>
<td>76,59</td>
<td>11,11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ou</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0,76</td>
<td>58,17</td>
<td>17,30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55,56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sem</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0,10</td>
<td>80,24</td>
<td>10,48</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>70,45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data

---

4 Since it was not possible to discriminate decentralizations of the Federal Government by municipality and federal entity (city halls or state government), it has been considered, for the purpose of this study, decentralized resources as part of the analysis of municipal budget.
There has been an important variation in the total amount of available resources. The total amount of investments seems to suffer, in this case, an impact from the number of municipalities: “Ou”, R$ 612,853,19; “Ex”, R$ 1,545,188,10; “Sem”, R$ 1,728,717,13. The highest investment average happened in administrations which share sport and leisure policies with other areas (R$ 17,30).

Table 3: Levels of investment per capita in SLF per administrative structure and CP2 in the state of Piauí

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. Mun.</th>
<th>Investment in Sport and Leisure Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. SLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ou</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sem</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data

As it happened on level C_P1, the highest average of investment occurs among “Ou” administrations (R$ 16,54). The percentage is quite close to those of cities that have invested less than R$ 1,00/month by inhabitant (73,53%, 73,68%, 75%), showing it does not suffer impact from the political-administrative structure. The total of investment by level of political-administrative organization was: “Ex”, R$ 2,016,714,93; “Sem”, R$ 1,927,199,36; “Ou”, R$ 1,214,354,41. Administrations which have an exclusive department, even with lower “n”, when compared to “Sem”, showed higher investment in SLF.
Table 4: Levels of investment per capita in SLF per administrative structure and CP3 in the state of Piauí

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. Mun.</th>
<th>Investment in Sport and Leisure Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. SLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ou</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sem</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data

On the third level (table 4), for the first time, exclusive departments showed higher average of resources invested in SLF (R$ 10,45) and lower percentage of municipalities spending less R$ 12,00/year per capita. On the other hand, “Sem” administrations were the ones which broke through the minimum investments limit over R$ 1,00, however being the only cities not to reach R$ 12,00 per capita. The highest nominal investment belongs to “Ex” administrations: R$ 2,654,237,27 – followed by “Ou”: R$ 1,651,234,58 and “Sem”: R$ 346,720,60.

Table 5: Levels of investment per capita in SLF per administrative structure and CP4 in the state of Piauí

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. Mun.</th>
<th>Investment in Sport and Leisure Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. SLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ou</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sem</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data

On level 4 (CP4), table 5, there is a significant variation, mainly regarding the lowest and the highest investment numbers. The lowest numbers, for “Ex” and “Sem”
administrations, broke the R$ 1,00 barrier. The lowest *per capita* investment was achieved in “Sem” administrations (R$ 5,70) and all city halls spent less than R$ 1,00 month/year by inhabitant. The best performance in this point was around “Ou” administrations, with 70% of municipalities investing less than R$ 12,00/year *per capita*, besides being the ones which invested the most. Investments in SLF per political-administrative structure were: “Ex”, R$ 1,371,142,69; “Ou”, R$ 2,604,117,01; “Sem”, R$ 581,354,64.

Table 6: Levels of investment *per capita* in SLF per administrative structure and CP5 in the state of Piauí

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. Mun.</th>
<th>Investment in Sport and Leisure Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. SLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ou</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sem</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Research Data

On the last level (CP5), “Ex” structures got inferior results to “Ou” structures, in every context. In this case, it seems that having an administrative structure promoted no gains in terms of investments in SLF, especially concerning municipalities that have invested less than R$ 12,00/year *per capita*. And, despite the higher number of “Ex” cities, the total of numbers were inferior to “Ou”: “Ex”, R$ 2,020,558,96; and “Ou”, R$ 2,022,228,59, respectively.

This diversity of results is common to our federalist regime (ARRETECHE, 2010; SANTOS, 2011; SOUZA, 2001). However, it can be observed, in respect to the hypotheses made, that:

Licere, Belo Horizonte, v.21, n.4, dez/2018 177
H1. It was possible to confirm that, in the state of Piauí, municipal governments with an exclusive department for sport and leisure ("Ex") invested in the year 2013 invest more *per capita* in SLF than those with that did not have department ("Sem"). This is true in all scenarios (CP1, CP2, CP3 e CP4).

H2. It was not possible to confirm if, in the state of Piauí, municipal governments with an exclusive department for sport and leisure ("Ex") invested more *per capita* in SLF than those that share the administration with other areas ("Ou"). This was only true for level CP3; on the others, investments made by “Ou” have prevailed.

In this regard, results do not allow to affirm if having an exclusive department for sports and leisure raises average investments *per capita* in SLF. Another variables seem to interact. Perhaps the local culture creates needs independently of the administrative structure. Analyzing this reality, strictly, it is possible to observe that the result found compromises the idea that the existence of a political-strategic actor, the Secretary of Sports, is an important aspect to elevate the average *per capita* number invested in SLF. Other variables may be important to be considered.

**Final Considerations**

In times of spending cuts in public social policies, with the aggregation and suppression of first-grade structures to formulate and implement sport and leisure public policies, results found here are intriguing. Political-administrative structure has not interfered in investments in SLF in the state of Piauí. Such discovery contradicts the agenda presented by the II National Sport Conference, that deliberated about the “Creation of specific departments for Sport and Leisure in state and municipal contexts (Secretaries, Institutions, Councils), with administrative and budget autonomy, specific
councils and development plans, for the implementation and continuity of sport and leisure policies in all dimensions, aiming social inclusion, and setting a maximum deadline for this creation” (BRASIL, 2006) but results are completely aligned to what literature points out about decentralization of social policies in Brazilian federalism (ARRETCHE, 2010).

Without a parameter to judge expenses from citizens’ preferences it is not possible to affirm in a peremptory way that having a first-grade administrative structure leads, necessarily, to an increasing on investments to SLF. Perhaps the difference lays in the quality of public expenses. Preferences may be associated to one subfunction of SLF: community sport, performance and leisure sport; or in the way these investments are made.

Therefore, federalism supports differences in funding when these differences are produced by subnational entities. They may be anchored in variables far from local managers’ reach, like the urban profile of the city, that impacts on IPTU revenue (GOMES; DOWELL, 2000), or citizens’ preferences in election periods, that may constrain the government into acting on other agendas. It is evident in this research that there is no pattern in the investment in SLF in the state of Piauí.

Data reinforce that, more than “municipalizing” sport and leisure public policies (given that expenses already show this municipalization), it is necessary that policy communities focus on public municipal expenses in order to point which variables interfere in the achievement of these policies. That means, there should be municipalization on the sport and leisure research agenda so that it is possible to better understand the funding of sport and leisure policies in Brazil.
REFERENCES


BRUST, C.; BAGGIO, I.C; SALDANHA FILHO, M.F. Repensar a gestão das políticas públicas de esporte e lazer: O caso de Santa Maria/RS. Motrivivência, Florianópolis, a. XVIII, n. 27, p. 179-192, 2006.


Endereço dos Autores:

Edmilson Santos dos Santos
Rua Clóvis Beviláqua 160/02
Salvador – BA – 41.603-120
Endereço Eletrônico: edmilson.santos@univasf.edu.br