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Special Issue
Paul Feyerabend and the History and Philosophy of Science

Interview:
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Deivide Garcia da Silva Oliveira (DO) and Leandro Giri (LG). Let's start with the beginning of your intellectual career. What first drew you to study Paul Feyerabend?

Eric Oberheim: I came to Feyerabend through Thomas Kuhn's work and then Paul Hoyningen-Huene. During my M.Phil. at the Department for History and

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Philosophy of Science at the University of Cambridge, England, I became interested in the incommensurability of scientific theories. Peter Lipton recommended a Ph.D. with Paul Hoyningen-Huene, who pointed me toward Feyerabend. My initial focus was Feyerabend's *cryptic* "Explanation, reduction and empiricism" (1962), where he first used the term "incommensurable". I quickly came to realize that Feyerabend had been largely misunderstood, sometimes for good reasons (hence the "cryptic"). When I moved to continental Europe, I tried to learn German by co-translating (with my friend Daniel Sirtes) Feyerabend's 1960 paper "Das Problem der Existenz theoretischer Entitäten" ("The problem of the existence of theoretical entities") and Feyerabend's 1972 paper "Von der beschrankten Gültigkeit methodologischer Regeln" ("On the limited validity of methodological rules") from German into English for the third volume of Feyerabend's collected papers that John Preston was organizing. The first paper belongs to Feyerabend's early philosophy (associated with Karl Popper and then Thomas Kuhn through incommensurability). The second paper reflects the onset of Feyerabend's later philosophy (largely associated with *Against Method* and *Science in a Free Society, Farewell to Reason, and Tyranny of Science*). My latest focus concerns the complex transition from his early philosophy as an attempted synthesis of Ludwig Wittgenstein on meaning with Popper on method to Feyerabend's later philosophy, which coincides with Feyerabend's announcement that he is breaking from Popper's school (under the influence of David Bohm), and Feyerabend's announcement that his new "position" will be titled "Against method" sloganized as "Anything goes!" in two separate letters, both dated 17 December 1967, one to Imre Lakatos and the other to John Watkins – I guess my attempt to understand the relation between the those two Feyerabend's papers that I co-translated last century is still ongoing. I hope it has fared better than my attempt to learn German.

(DO; LG). What makes Feyerabend uniquely compelling for you?

Eric Oberheim: Nothing. Feyerabend radicalized, popularized, and sloganized significant insights about science discussed by Mach, Einstein, Bohr, and especially Bohm. He was part of an attempt to establish scientific philosophy after the war. As the student leader of the "third Vienna Circle" (the Kraft Circle), he saw himself as a scientist-philosopher working in the tradition that had taken root in Vienna with its famous Circle before the war. He did not know that the USA was secretly funding this endeavor by financing the Alpbach summer school to stem the tide of Marxism and communism on the continent, which is what brought him in contact with Popper and Erwin Schrödinger, whose letters of recommendation launched his spectacular professional career. Thanks to the great work of Daniel Kuby, we know that in Alpbach, Feyerabend gave a formal comment on Schrödinger's paper, criticizing Schrödinger's suggestion that *Anschaulichkeit* (vizualizability/intelligibility) should be a universal criterion for any good theory, given that it had to be abandoned at least temporarily to make progress in the development of quantum theory.

Feyerabend interests me because he developed fascinating ideas that he took to be trivial among the great scientist-philosophers whom he tried to emulate, and whose views he tried to improve through criticism. He wanted to become a great scientist-philosopher, not a philosopher of science, but when his physics research went nowhere, he turned to philosophy (like Popper, who was quickly becoming his mentor, who had turned to philosophy after his psychology work

went nowhere). Feyerabend wanted to help protect and promote scientific progress and to help revolutionize our worldview. By combining the best from Wittgenstein and Popper, while criticizing the worst in each, he developed his own scientific approach to philosophy. He tried to understand scientific revolutions and to provide the recipe for revolutionizing worldviews. Taking the deductivism of Victor Kraft and Popper as a starting point, he tried to develop a better model for the acquisition of knowledge than Popper's formal model of scientific progress (falsificationism), which he criticized because it cannot apply to scientific revolutions due to meaning change, and so hinders scientific progress instead of helping it. With his early philosophy, he was trying to promote science and its progress for ethical reasons, before he decided in December 1967 that happiness should trump Truth.

Feyerabend was uniquely *positioned*. In general philosophy of science, he started directly between Popper and Wittgenstein through the remnants of Viennese logical positivism under the supervision of Viktor Kraft. He kept copious short-hand notes of discussions with regular participants in the Kraft Circle, many of whom went on to illustrious careers of their own, and guests like Wittgenstein. These notes became the basis of the Ph.D. thesis and his early work, including what is now called "the incommensurability of scientific theories". Feyerabend was also uniquely positioned between Bohrians and Bohm in the context of discussions about the "Copenhagen interpretation" in the foundations of quantum theory following the Einstein-Bohr debates. Feyerabend brought a scientific approach to epistemology by treating meaning as shared dispositional properties (otherwise, intentions are causally inconsequential). His work on the foundations of quantum mechanics and in general philosophy of science was closely connected, with the former motivating the latter. He was also uniquely positioned with respect to his proximity to Thomas Kuhn and what became *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1970/1962), especially Kuhn's use of "incommensurable" and progress through repeating cycles of normal science, crisis, and then revolution.

More specifically, following his physicalist-nominalist interpretation of Wittgenstein, meanings are not embodied in speakers but exist as causal relations to potential reactors (other people). When you talk, what you mean does not matter. What matters is how people react to what you say, which typically depends on their interpretation of it (what they take you to mean), which depends on the theories they use to make sense of it. Different theories result in different meanings, and initial reactions may give way to new interpretations upon further reflection. The result: one observation sentence can have incompatible meanings that state incompatible facts that have different implications. Like in a Gestalt-switch, everyday observation sentences like "the ball fell" can be interpreted in incompatible ways; for example, as ducks or rabbits, but not both at the same time. Feyerabend thought scientific revolutions can change ducks into rabbits. "That ball fell" can be interpreted to state the fact that it was pulled by gravity, or the fact that it was pushed by its impetus. Its meaning depends on which theory we use to interpret it. Scientific revolutions change the meanings of the terms used to state the theories we use to explain our observations, giving incompatible meanings to the observation sentences used to test those theories. That is why, according to Feyerabend, a formal account of explanation and reduction cannot be given for theories separated by scientific revolutions. Due to meaning variance in the terms used

to state the theories used to predict and potentially explain observation sentences deduced from those theories, so as to be used to test them, the observation sentences take on new incompatible meanings rendering theories separated by revolutions formally disjoint. Put another way, theories separated by revolutions are "incommensurable". They can have no formal relations due to meaning change, neither directly, nor through seemingly neutral observation sentences deduced from them, because exactly the same observation sentences are used to make incompatible observation statements.

The scope of Feyerabend's considerations is also remarkable. He navigated the philosophical landscape from logical positivism to post-modernism, all the while drawing on sources that his contemporaries had ignored or dismissed as out of bounds – such as the history of Witchcraft. He repeatedly defended outsiders from censorship and exclusion from the scientific community because they dared to propose potentially fruitful theories that were deemed to be bad science by the reigning consensus due to their own philosophical prejudices, such as in the case of Bohm's proposed hidden variables strategy and the Copenhagen school's reactions to it.

But none of that would matter much today if Feyerabend's work did not continue to resonate with contemporary discussion while reaching an ever-wider audience. His lectures were infamous as legendary performances. His written work is sometimes performative, too (which has contributed to much confusion about his intentions).

Feyerabend had a talent for provoking critical reflection that can challenge common misconceptions about science and progress. This is partly because his work continues to become increasingly topical, but also partly because Feyerabend's intriguing ideas feel genuine. Feyerabend had been indoctrinated into the Hitler Youth. He had lectured on Nazi-ideology at officers' school during the war. He had led companies during the retreat on the Eastern Front before getting shot up and paralyzed from the waist down for the rest of a life spent on high doses of painkillers. Who could be better situated to warn of the dangers of conformity, and to advocate for the crucial roles pluralism should play in science and society?

(DO; LG). In a world marked by environmental crises, disinformation, and epistemic tensions, what urgent lessons does Feyerabend's philosophy offer us today?

Eric Oberheim: Feyerabend's critical rationalist approach to philosophy emphasizes that the general public needs to be educated in the crucial roles played by critical thinking in science, education, and progress. People need to be engaged with science. Feyerabend thought this was the best way to avoid the pitfalls of populism, intolerance, and ultimately tyranny: The tyrants who preach some "Truth". Feyerabend thought science promotes progress, and so is the best tool for fighting the tyranny of ideology. But in his later work, he also increasingly emphasized that science can come at great costs. Understanding requires misrepresentation through abstraction, which can foster a loss of meaningful personal relations as people become objects of study. To anyone familiar with Feyerabendian themes, it should come as no surprise that Feyerabend's work continues to resonate in a post-COVID world through the

onset of the age of the tyranny of misinformation ín the shadow of an impending global environmental disaster, with science offering out only hope for salvation.

Feyerabend's argument for pluralism in science is predicated on, and should serve as an example that illustrates, the need for critical thinking, through science education, to foster epistemic tolerance in the pursuit of progress and the flourishing of humanity's potential. Science is what keeps away the dark ages. While it may be our only hope, its enormous potential comes with potentially equally great costs.

(DO; LG). You have worked extensively on Feyerabend's correspondence. What do we learn from these letters that we cannot find in his published works?

Eric Oberheim: To answer that informatively, I would need to summarize my research results on an ongoing project that began last century. Those results are currently being published in various papers, such as "Paul Feyerabend on meaning and method: From the limited validity of falsificationism to 'Anything goes!'" (Oberheim 2025). "Feyerabend's Wittgenstein" (Forthcoming I), "Feyerabend versus Popper" (Forthcoming II), and the new *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* entry on Paul Feyerabend (Oberheim and Preston 2025) as well as the new entry on "The incommensurability of scientific theories" (Oberheim and Hoyningen-Huene 2024). I've also just finished editing Feyerabend's correspondence with some prominent logical empiricists, Bohm and Kuhn, which has a lengthy introduction co-authored with Matteo Collodel that has separate sub-sections; one on Feyerabend's relation to logical empiricists, one on his relation to Bohm and one on his relation to Kuhn. I am still co-editing the final volume of the series, which collects Feyerabend's correspondence with three Popperians: John Watkins, Joseph Agassi, and Imre Lakatos (the letters they exchanged before those already collected and published in *For and Against Method* (Motterlini 1999). Each of these correspondences illuminates otherwise hidden aspects of the ideas Feyerabend developed at various stages of his formative years. Feyerabend's correspondences have been crucial for my understanding of his published work, especially the transition from his early to his later philosophy. Feyerabend's correspondence with Watkins stands out because of Watkins's close relations with both Feyerabend and Popper. Taken together, Feyerabend's correspondences with Watkins and Lakatos allow us to locate Feyerabend's epiphany (the realization he no longer self-identified as a Popperian) in December 1967, and how this marked the transition from his early to his later philosophies.

Most of my research in the last few years went into three central figures in Feyerabend's formative development: Wittgenstein, Popper, and then Bohm. The invitation Feyerabend brought to Wittgenstein to attend a Kraft Circle meeting suggests that Feyerabend was aware of the tension between what he took to be Wittgenstein's top-down contextual theory of meaning and Popper's "Basissätze" (basic statements) before he submitted his Ph.D. thesis in 1951. The tension had resulted from Feyerabend's attempt to combine Wittgenstein's insights into meaning with Popper's account of method.

Generally, Feyerabend's correspondence provides a wealth of insights into how these ideas were then developed into their various presentations in his

published works that would otherwise remain opaque. They have proven to be an invaluable source of information concerning his intellectual development and how it should be framed.

Feyerabend's private correspondence in conjunction with other archival materials also illustrates Feyerabend's tendency to hyperbolize his own intellectual development. His motto seems to have been "Never let facts ruin a good story". There are many significant examples of misleading autobiographical remarks. For example, Matteo Collodel noticed that Lakatos had already backed out of his part of the *For and Against Method* book-project well before Lakatos's untimely death (Feyerabend implies that Lakatos' death was the reason that Lakatos' *Pro-Method* half was never written). There seems to be no hard evidence that Feyerabend actually even ever met Bertold Brecht, let alone that Brecht offered to hire him as his production assistant. Feyerabend often told versions of that story to emphasize how much he valued his intellectual independence, to explain what drove him to make many consequential career decisions. Another example of misleading autobiographical remarks concerns Feyerabend's denials that he had ever studied philosophy. While Feyerabend never (officially) studied philosophy (a claim he seems to have taken pride in, insisting he was "not a philosopher"), Feyerabend did take classes in philosophy (of science) in all eight semesters that he studied at the University of Vienna, culminating in his Ph.D. in philosophy in 1951. As Feyerabend aged, his enthusiasm for the great scientist-philosophers increasingly turned into a dislike of professional philosophy, especially professionalized philosophy of science (such as Popper's British Society for Philosophy of Science), which he ridiculed for having become delusionally divorced from its subject. Feyerabend's correspondence with Karl Popper (who played the role of mentor and quasi-father-figure in the late 1940s and 1950s) and with other members of Popper's school also paints a very different picture than his published autobiographical reflections with respect to his intellectual trajectory in many respects. Interesting details emerge into subtle patterns. For example, in his autobiographical reflections, Feyerabend sometimes claimed that he had applied for a British Council scholarship to study under Ludwig Wittgenstein and that Popper had only been his second choice, which again as noticed by Matteo Collodel, given the timing of when they met, Wittgenstein's health, and a copy of Feyerabend's application, seems patently false. While Feyerabend clearly tried to distance himself from Popper by increasingly embellishing his relation to Wittgenstein, it also turns out that Feyerabend thought Popper and Watkins had misunderstood his Wittgensteinian criticism of Popper's falsificationism that he had launched in "Explanation, reduction and empiricism" (1962) with his claim that general (framework) theories are "incommensurable" (deductively disjoint) making the falsification of one by another impossible – which is also what he argued precludes the possibility of any formal account of a more comprehensive "Explanation" (against Hempel), inter-theoretic "reduction" (against Nagel), "and empiricism" (against Popper and Carnap) for general theories – Hence the title of the essay.

So, on one hand, Feyerabend thought with incommensurability showed that Popper's empiricism has only a limited validity. With the Brownian motion example of a crucial experiment that was not a falsification, he had effectively falsified Popper's account by showing where it should apply (for testing lower-level laws and theories within frameworks) and where it should not (for testing

competing universal framework theories). On the other hand, it seemed to Popper and Watkins that Feyerabend was just repeating, albeit unclearly, Popper's views, while pretending to develop them as a criticism of Popper's views. After exactly this routine happened to Feyerabend after *Against Method*, Feyerabend began calling it "the Lessing effect", claiming to be a victim. His critics were repeating his views as if they were criticism of them, all the while seeming to Popper and Watkins to be the culprit. In *Against Method*, Feyerabend criticizes Popper for advocating for a purportedly universally valid methodological procedure (falsificationism), while Popper had often emphasized that there are no universally valid methodological rules, just rules of thumb, long before Feyerabend started criticizing Popper for presenting falsificationism as the only methodological procedure that should guide theory choice based on empirical evidence. For his part, Popper does not seem to have understood Feyerabend's views on incommensurability (nor Kuhn's). Instead, Popper promoted the myth that incommensurability implies incomparability, in his *The Myth of the* [*Untestable*] *Framework*. In the penultimate letter of his correspondence with Popper, Feyerabend laments the fact that they (he and Popper) never came to terms with respect to incommensurability.

Feyerabend seems to have been especially prone to rewriting his own history, even if the Kurt Waldheim affair motivated his telling shocking wartime stories in his aptly named autobiography *Killing Time*. After all, we should decide on methodological principles in light of our most successful theories, and as they say "Whatever works, works" or as Feyerabend put it, "Anything goes!".

(DO; LG). What tensions or insights emerge from his private exchanges?

Eric Oberheim: The division of Feyerabend's work into early and later suggests an apparent paradox. Feyerabend's philosophy splits into early and later before and after *Against Method* (1975), which seems to follow his dramatic break from Popper; and yet, *Against Method* is a cut-copy-paste, repackaged collage of the ideas and arguments developed in his earlier publications. Feyerabend seems to make a dramatic reversal in his basic approach to philosophy while maintaining and expanding on the same ideas and arguments.

Feyerabend was (perceived as) Popper's pitbull before he suddenly became a voracious Popper critic, infamous for "Anything goes!". One of the most significant insights that emerges from scrutiny of his correspondence concerns exactly how, when, and why his tumultuous relationship with Karl Popper ended; or even more specifically, how and why Feyerabend eventually broke from Popper and his school, and how this was directly accompanied by his turn to his new "position" that he was to set out under the rubric *Against Method*. A comparison of Feyerabend's correspondence with John Watkins and Imre Lakatos (two of Popper's students, with whom Feyerabend was close) reveals many insights into the nature of that turning point. Most notably, on 17 December 1967, in two letters, Feyerabend announced that he had just had an epiphany: He no longer self-identified as a Popperian. His realization occurred while listening to Lakatos lecture Popper's philosophy of science (falsificationism) to undergrads, he realized just how far he had gradually strayed from it – especially given his rejection of its applicability to general (framework) theories as delineated in "Explanation, reduction and empiricism" (1962), and his rejection of Popper's admonition against protecting theories from refutation

with ad hoc hypotheses (which may be necessary for their development, as illustrated by Galileo's case). Feyerabend then generalized from the limited validity of falsificationism and its admonition against ad hoc protection of theories from evidence to the limited validity of all methodological rules. In those same two dramatic letters to Watkins and Lakatos, Feyerabend even announced that he would develop his new "position" (from now on always in "scare quotes") under the title "Against method", a choice of title inspired by Susan Sontag's *Against Interpretation* (1966). These two letters also illuminate how Feyerabend developed his slogan "Anything goes!" and why he decided HAPPINESS should TRUMP "TRUTH" (his self-declared "hedonism") as our guide to beliefs about the nature of reality, marking the transition from his early to his later philosophy as a reversal on realism – from recommending correcting common knowledge with science to protecting common knowledge from scientism. Feyerabend's generalization from the limited validity of falsificationism due to incommensurability to "Anything goes" was part of his reason for rejecting Popper's normative approach to scientific method, which he had initially adopted but later retracted, before he removed his endorsements and praise of Popper and Popper's views from the versions of his papers that are included in the first two volumes of his self-edited collected papers that were published in 1981.

Feyerabend has the reputation of often changing his mind as he expounded provocative criticisms of philosophies with his peculiar views on science and progress from the vestiges of Viennese logical positivism in the 1950s through the onset of postmodernism in the 1990s. Yet Feyerabend developed his peculiar views on meaning and method in the early 1950s as part of an attempt at a synthesis of Popper's critical rationalism with Wittgenstein's contextualism, and Feyerabend's later philosophy resulted not from abandoning his peculiar views, but rather from expanding on them by attempting to apply them outside the domain of scientific progress to earlier revolutionary transitions. So Feyerabend criticized many different accounts with his provocative ideas about meaning change and world change (most notably accounts expounded by Carnap, Popper, Hempel, Nagel and Bohr). And Feyerabend reversed himself on realism (from suggesting that our best scientific theories should dictate our ontological beliefs, to one should decide on what to believe based on whatever makes one happy) while changing his fundamental approach to philosophy. He initially tried to contribute to the development of a positive model for the acquisition of knowledge that suggests revising everyday language and even common sense, given the discovery that the idea of "objective reality" was a metaphysical mistake before he started recommending that one should disregard the ontological implications of our best scientific theories if that is what makes you happy, and yet Feyerabend's core views about science and society remain unchanged from his 1951 Ph.D. thesis all the way to one of the last unfinished books he was working on when he died in 1994 (*The Conquest of Abundance*). This becomes increasingly clear given his other posthumously published works, such as *The Philosophy of Nature, The Tyranny of Science,* and hopefully *Science as An Art* (in preparation), and is also evidenced by letters Feyerabend sent to Kuhn in the 1980s that try to explain what he was trying to do.

Another important tension in Feyerabend's relation to Popper that his correspondence greatly clarifies is Popper's repeated (sometimes questionable) accusations that Feyerabend was plagiarizing his (Popper's) work. It seems that

Popper did not fully trust Feyerabend. Popper sometimes even wondered if Feyerabend was purposely withholding some of his (Popper's) missing early manuscripts that Popper had left behind when he left for New Zealand, but desperately wanted back. Popper thought Feyerabend was not just plagiarizing him, but also perhaps even literally stealing his work from him.

The few new recently published letters in Feyerabend's correspondence with Kuhn exemplify the depth and breadth of the rift between Kuhn and Feyerabend that opened in their relations when Kuhn left for Copenhagen on the prestigious history of the quantum theory interviews project that Feyerabend had wanted to participate in, but for his reputation as a harsh critic of the Copenhagen interpretation, which had made him unwelcome. They also expose how Feyerabend thought his "historical turn" was the result of generalizing his peculiar views to earlier revolutionary transitions before the advent of modern science.

My research into Feyerabend's relation to Bohm, as part of my research for volume two of *Feyerabend's Formative Years* (Collodel and Oberheim 2024), was also extremely illuminating with respect to the depth of Feyerabend's intellectual debt to Bohm. Feyerabend took himself to be fighting for Bohm. It was on Bohm's behalf that Feyerabend launched his "Plea for more tolerance in matter epistemological" (1963) with his incommensurability-based Bohmian argument for pluralism, itself based on the Brownian motion example Bohm had been using to defend his admittedly ad hoc "hidden variables" strategy. Even Feyerabend's criticism that due to meaning variance Popper's falsificationism has only a limited validity because it cannot apply to universal "framework" theories, but just to low-level laws and theories within a shared theoretical framework is decidedly extremely Bohmian given Bohm's criticisms of Popper's methodology in a paper Bohm wrote that was recovered from Popper's papers that is included in the second volume of Feyerabend's years collection.

(DO; LG). Feyerabend's provocative style made him a controversial figure. Do you think this polemical tone was necessary and strategic, or did it become an obstacle for the reception of his ideas? How should we read this dimension of his work today?

Eric Oberheim: It was a strategy that often turned into an obstacle. It helped him reach many outside the boundaries of traditional philosophy of science, or even outside academia altogether. One of the things that stands out the most concerning Feyerabend's work is its reach and the diversity of his enormous audience. On the other hand, his polemic strategy often turned into an obstacle because it contributed to widespread misunderstanding of his views. This is also partly why so many readers take away very different messages from Feyerabend's texts on topics that they feel very passionate about. Many of Feyerabend's ideas may sound provocative, but on closer inspection and without the polemics, they often turn out to be easily relatable and even seem rather trivial.

(DO; LG). While *Against Method* is his most famous book, what aspects of Feyerabend's thought have gained new relevance in recent research (for instance, in archival studies, culture, technology, or interdisciplinary dialogue)? Do you think that such a new relevance holds some relationship with current debates (such as democracy, crisis of public authority and public truth)?

Eric Oberheim: My hope is that Feyerabend's work will continue to inform and provoke discussions of many pressing topics. For example, in his early works, which contributed to *Against Method*, Feyerabend warned of the political dangers posed by ideologies. As an ex-lecturer of Nazi ideology, he took critical thinking, always taking a scientific approach, to be the only way to prevent authoritarianism and oppression (following in Popper's critical rationalist footsteps). After Bohm and the bomb, it had become ominously clear that science through science education must thrive to sustain democracy.

Feyerabend tried to promote science to prevent the spread of malicious misinformation. He argued that we should correct our common knowledge and reform everyday language to reflect the progress science has made. Many of his central considerations have dramatically increased in relevance given the current political climate in the USA, where science is under attack by a majority that is scientifically illiterate. Conant had set Kuhn the task of developing a mandatory pro-science course that explains science and its importance to be required nationwide for accreditation to confer a B.A. That project led to Kuhn's discovery of incommensurability, but the plan was never implemented. Science education lapsed as we slide into the post-modernist era that has devolved into the age of misinformation. Turning our back on Truth did turn out to be among the Worst Enemies of Science.

(DO; LG). Feyerabend championed pluralism, methodological diversity, and what he provocatively called "epistemological anarchism". What impact do these ideas have on current debates in modern science and non-scientific knowledge?

Eric Oberheim: Feyerabend always approached every subject scientifically. In his early work, he wanted to correct common knowledge with science to protect progress for ethical reasons. In his later work, he tried to protect common knowledge and diversity from scientism, and the abuse of science to generate profit at the expense of the people it should be helping.

(DO; LG). Looking ahead, what Feyerabendian lines of inquiry do you see as most promising for your future research? Are there aspects of his thought still underexplored?

Eric Oberheim: After I finish the third and final volume of the *Feyerabend's Formative Years* series, I hope to finish editing Feyerabend's beautiful, as yet unpublished *Science as an Art*, which is an original, English revised and extended version of *Wissenschaft als Kunst* (1984) that Feyerabend worked on in the mid- to late 1980s. I found various versions of drafts of each chapter dispersed among his "Berkeley papers" in the archive (the papers from his office in Berkeley had been stored in a box in a basement until 2024, when they were retrieved and deposited in Konstanz).

Also, I've been working on my own Kuhnian/Feyerabendian book on pluralism for a long time (*Thinking Outside the Box*) that I still hope to finish. More generally, strong arguments for pluralism in science and society should never be allowed to go out of fashion.

(DO; LG). If you had to recommend one key idea from Feyerabend that everyone – o academic or not – should know, what would it be? Is there a short phrase that, for you, best captures his enduring legacy?

Eric Oberheim: Feyerabend's key idea was incommensurability, and the slogan that best captures his legacy is "Anything goes!". Everyone should know that pluralism is the best way to promote progress and prevent oppression.

(DO; LG). Thank you so much!

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