Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal <div id="journalDescription"><em>Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science</em> is an open-access semiannual [June and December] online journal published by the <a title="PPGH-UFMG" href="http://historia.fafich.ufmg.br/indexi.php" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Graduate Program in History</a> (Science and Culture in History) of <a href="https://ufmg.br/international-visitors" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Federal University of Minas Gerais</a> (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais).</div> <div> </div> <div><em>Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science</em> promotes scholarly research in the historiography of science and chronicles its history and criticism. Although historiography of science is a sub-discipline of History, we construe this subject broadly to include analysis of the historiography of science produced by history of science, philosophy of science, science education and related disciplines. By focusing its analysis on the different historical, social and epistemological implications of science, historiography of science is a transversal knowledge with respect to the production of science, hence the name of this journal. In order to accomplish its purpose, <em>Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science</em> discusses historical, theoretical, conceptual and methodological aspects of the different themes, works and authors present in this tradition, as well as the new approaches in the recent historiography of science.</div> Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais en-US Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science 2526-2270 Eduardo Salles de O. Barra https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/35135 <div><strong>Interview: Eduardo Salles de O. Barra</strong></div> Eduardo Barra Veronica Calazans Mauro L. Condé Copyright (c) 2021 Eduardo Barra, Veronica Calazans, Mauro L. Condé https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 2021-06-17 2021-06-17 10 10.24117/2526-2270.2021.i10.07 The Rehabilitation of the Uses of Relativism https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/35136 <p><strong>Book Review</strong></p> <p><strong>&nbsp;</strong><strong>Kusch, Martin.&nbsp;<em>Relativism in the Philosophy of Science</em>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. 86 pp. ISBN: 9781108969611, $ 20.00</strong></p> Fernanda Schiavo Nogueira Copyright (c) 2021 Fernanda Schiavo Nogueira https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 2021-06-17 2021-06-17 10 10.24117/2526-2270.2021.i10.08 Getting Emotional https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/35129 <div>This paper aims to demonstrate the fecundity of pairing specific insights from&nbsp;<em>On Certainty</em>&nbsp;with research in the philosophy and history of the natural sciences. To do so, it discusses one set of related themes in the work that focus on the possibility of and nature of revolutionary change. Specifically, I argue that several of Wittgenstein’s rather gnomic remarks presage van Fraassen’s insistence on the need for decisions and emotions throughout scientific revolutions. Moreover, I argue that reading both together enriches each’s individual account and helps further make sense of why and how conversion is not just a ‘mad leap in the dark’.</div> Charles Djordjevic Copyright (c) 2021 Charles Djordjevic https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 2021-06-17 2021-06-17 10 10.24117/2526-2270.2021.i10.01 The Epistemology of Psychology from a Perspective of Wittgenstein’s Grammatical Analysis https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/35130 <div> <p>This article evaluates Wittgenstein’s possible contributions to an epistemology of psychology. Although the author admittedly neither proposes an epistemology nor examines specific issues of psychology as a science, we understand that his reflections on the meaning of psychological concepts may contribute to a better understanding of psychology as a science, which involves understanding its object and methods. With that goal in mind and based on the concept of language developed in his second phase, especially in his work&nbsp;<em>Philosophical Investigations</em>, we retrace his efforts to obtain a picture of the grammar of psychological concepts, emphasizing two of its aspects: first, the place and role of first‑person expressive propositions in the psychological language-game and second, how this understanding of the perspective of the first person implies in refusing to reduce explanations of human behavior to causal explanations in favor of explanations based on reasons.</p> </div> Mirian Donat Copyright (c) 2021 Mirian Donat https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 2021-06-17 2021-06-17 10 10.24117/2526-2270.2021.i10.02 Paradigm and Objectivity in the Sciences https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/35131 <div> <p>The concept of paradigm became, in the middle of the last century, a central concept in the philosophical discussion about the nature of scientific knowledge. However, little attention has been paid to the strength of this concept in the constitution of the senses in general and, in particular, about its role in the transmission and acquisition of&nbsp;<em>new&nbsp;</em>scientific concepts, not only in the community of scientists, but also among basic-science teachers and students. I argue that a Wittgensteinian-inspired reflection on the transcendental use of this concept, as part of the grammar of scientific concepts, can clarify not only fundamental questions about the nature of scientific activity (avoiding both dogmatic and relativistic conceptions), but can also provide us with clues to identify sufficient, though not necessary, conditions so that something becomes an object for scientific thinking in the context of school education.</p> </div> Cristiane Gottschalk Copyright (c) 2021 Cristiane Gottschalk https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 2021-06-17 2021-06-17 10 10.24117/2526-2270.2021.i10.03 Scientific Representation, Causality and Induction in L. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/35132 <div> <p>The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how the Wittgenstein&nbsp;<em>Tractatus&nbsp;</em>deals with themes related to the laws of nature, as well as with the metatheoretical principles of science. More specifically, our intention is to expose the notions of scientific representation linked to principles such as those of causality and induction. As a starting point, we propose that the notion of non-precedence of one scientific theory over another is of Hertzian inspiration, which argues that “one image may be more suitable for one purpose, another for another” (HERTZ, 1956, p. 3). As an unfolding of this notion, the systems of geometric representation of Hertz and Boltzmann will serve the&nbsp;<em>Tractatus&nbsp;</em>in order to demonstrate that laws, like the law of causality, as form and not content, only represent the network (any method) that, after all, is optional. On the other hand, metatheoretical principles such as induction have no logical basis and their effect, in the wake of what Hume thought, is only psychological. Like the other themes of the&nbsp;<em>Tractatus</em>, its Philosophy of Science cannot be understood outside a broader context, which is the proper context to the criticism of language. Therefore, what is presented here intends not to be divorced from the relationship between logic, language and science, since, in our view, these are the three pillars of support of the&nbsp;<em>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.</em></p> </div> Eduardo Simões Copyright (c) 2021 Eduardo Simões https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 2021-06-17 2021-06-17 10 10.24117/2526-2270.2021.i10.04 Kuhn and Wittgenstein https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/35133 <div>For dropping the incommensurability idea elaborated at the time of&nbsp;<em>The Structure of Scientific Revolutions</em>, Kuhn dismisses the concept of “revolution”. The incommensurability involved the incomparability of theories. In this new environment, the revolution is replaced by conceptual reformulation and the incommensurability becomes occasional. The linguistic turn in Kuhn’s thought involves conceptual changes whose aim is to get around the accusation of relativism that the former notion of incommensurability arouses. The most fundamental effect of these conceptual reformulations is the commitment to a traditional conception of semantics. It changes the comprehension of the historical and social nature of the foundations of the changes that scientific knowledge goes through. The comparison between the answer to the problem of paradigm priority attributed by Kuhn to Wittgenstein and Wittgenstein by himself shows that the basis of the normative nature of paradigm commitment is an essentialist concern. In the second half of this paper, I will evaluate Kuhn’s manner of getting around the problems of incommensurability in contrast to Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy dealing with similar issues in&nbsp;<em>On Certainty</em>. This enables one to essay answers to the problems of incommensurability without relativism or any commitment to a traditional conception of semantics. These contrasts show how far Kuhn’s new theory of science departs from the Wittgensteinian inspiration and abandons the point of view of&nbsp;<em>The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.&nbsp;</em>The development of these two halves makes it possible to indicate reasons to believe that questions concerning the theory and history of science can benefit largely from a grammatical exploration, which gives rise to a theory of science inspired by Wittgenstein’s thought, as Mauro Condé suggests.</div> Wagner Oliveira Copyright (c) 2021 Wagner Oliveira https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 2021-06-17 2021-06-17 10 10.24117/2526-2270.2021.i10.05 Science and its Grammar https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/35134 <div> <p>The article aims to demonstrate the possibility of writing the history of science from the later Wittgenstein viewpoint. To accomplish this purpose, it exposes the “theory of history” of Wittgensteinian inspiration, called “grammar of history”. Then it discusses the idea of a Wittgensteinian-inspired “theory of science”, here called “grammar of science”. Finally, based on the interconnections between the grammar of history and the grammar of science previously exposed, some guidelines for writing the history of science from a Wittgensteinian perspective are outlined.</p> </div> Mauro Condé Copyright (c) 2021 Mauro Condé https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 2021-06-17 2021-06-17 10 10.24117/2526-2270.2021.i10.06 Throwing Away the Ladder of Tradition After We Have Climbed up It https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/35127 <div>From the Editors</div> Mauro Condé Copyright (c) 2021 Mauro Condé https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 2021-06-17 2021-06-17 10