ATRIBUCIONES DE AGENCIA MENTAL Y EL DESAFÍO DESDE LA PSICOPATOLOGÍA

Autores

  • Pablo López-Silva Universidad de Valparaiso

Palavras-chave:

Atribución de agencia mental, fenomenología cognitiva, delirios, psicosis, psicopatología

Resumo

Una atribución de agencia mental es definida como el acto de asignar el inicio o autoría de un pensamiento en primera persona a un agente específico, esto, con el fin de generar grados suficientes de control sobre nuestra vida cognitiva. Si bien esta estrategia es fundamental para distinguir diferentes tipos de estados cognitivos – tales como deliberaciones, razonamientos, juicios, entre otros –, muchos autores han indicado que también es clave para entender experiencias cognitivas psicopatológicas en psicosis. Este artículo revisa la forma en que la estructura subjetiva de los delirios de inserción de pensamiento puede ser utilizada como una estrategia para evaluar los méritos argumentativos de las teorías que intentan explicar la arquitectura y naturaleza de las atribuciones de agencia mental. Luego de evaluar algunos aspectos fundamentales de las dos teorías dominantes en la literatura actual, se sugiere que, a pesar de sus importantes aportes al desarrollo de la discusión, tales enfoques no poseen los recursos explicativos suficientes para lidiar con el desafío propuesto.

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Publicado

2021-06-08

Como Citar

López-Silva, P. (2021). ATRIBUCIONES DE AGENCIA MENTAL Y EL DESAFÍO DESDE LA PSICOPATOLOGÍA. Revista Kriterion, 61(147). Recuperado de https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/34482

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