Semantic truth and pragmatic deception
linguistic perspectives on misinformation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17851/2237-2083.33.1.152-173Keywords:
semantics, pragmatics, disinformation, epistemic vigilance, language evolutionAbstract
The spread of misinformation through social media platforms seriously threatens democratic societies. This article discusses how the features of human cognition and communication are strategically harnessed by misinformation. From the perspective of cognition, we address theoretical strands that underpin the evolution of language, both rationalist (Chomsky, 2010, 2013, 2016) and functionalist (Reboul, 2017), leading to the epistemic vigilance approach (Sperber et al., 2010; Sperber; Mercier, 2017). The analysis reveals a conception of cognition that operates in communication with vulnerabilities to domineering use in mass communication environments, bypassing epistemic vigilance. To support this hypothesis, from a communication point of view, we will examine both rhetorical-pragmatic (Perelman; Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1996) and semantic-grammatical phenomena (Carlson, 2011) to substantiate the linguistic materiality of the manipulation in disinformation discourse.
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