ARE NECESSARY IDENTITIES EVER DISBELIEVED?
Palavras-chave:
Necessary identity, Beliefs, Indexicals, Proper names, Direct Reference TheoryResumo
The purpose of this paper is to bring out, by means of a simple thought experiment involving demonstratives, a discrepancy between what is expressed and what is believed (which contradicts the Theory of Direct Reference), and to consider some consequences of this – most notably, whether we might hold, for example, that the ancients never believed that Hesperus is not Phosphorus.
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Referências
BEALER, G. “Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance”. In: Conceivability and Possibility. Ed. T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. pp. 71-125.
CHALMERS, D. J. “The Components of Content” (Revised Version). In: Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Ed. D. J. Chalmers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. pp. 608-33.
CHURCH, A. “A Remark Concerning Quine's Paradox about Modality”. In: Propositions and Attitudes. Ed. N.Salmon & S. Soames. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. pp. 58-65. (Original Spanish version in 1982: Analisis Filosófico, 2, pp. 25-32.)
GENDLER, T. S. &HAWTHORNE, J. (eds.). “Conceivability and Possibility”. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002.
KAPLAN, D. “Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals”. In: Themes from Kaplan. Ed. J. Almog & J. Perry & H. Wettstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989 [1977]. pp. 481-563.
KRIPKE, S. “Naming and Necessity”. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980 [1972].
MAUNU, A. “Necessary a Posteriori Identity Truths: Fregeanism Beats Direct Reference Theory”. Axiomathes, 28, 2018. pp. 73-80.
RUSSELL, B. “On Denoting”. Mind, 14, 1905, pp. 479-93.
STALNAKER, R. “Assertion”. In: Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9: Pragmatics. Ed. P. Cole. New York: Academic Press, 1978. pp. 315-32. Reprinted in: Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. pp. 78-95.
STALNAKER, R. “Semantics for Belief”. Philosophical Topics, 15, 1987. Reprinted in: Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. pp. 117-29.
STALNAKER, R. “Assertion Revisited: On the Interpretation of Two-Dimensional Modal Semantics”. In: Two-Dimensional Semantics. Ed. M. Garcia-Carpintero & J. Macia. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. pp. 293-309.
YABLO, S. “No Fool’s Cold: Notes on Illusions of Possibility”. In: Two-Dimensional Semantics. Ed. M. Garcia-Carpintero & J. Macia. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Reprinted in:Thoughts: Papers on Mind, Meaning, and Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. pp. 151-70.
CHALMERS, D. J. “The Components of Content” (Revised Version). In: Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Ed. D. J. Chalmers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. pp. 608-33.
CHURCH, A. “A Remark Concerning Quine's Paradox about Modality”. In: Propositions and Attitudes. Ed. N.Salmon & S. Soames. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. pp. 58-65. (Original Spanish version in 1982: Analisis Filosófico, 2, pp. 25-32.)
GENDLER, T. S. &HAWTHORNE, J. (eds.). “Conceivability and Possibility”. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002.
KAPLAN, D. “Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals”. In: Themes from Kaplan. Ed. J. Almog & J. Perry & H. Wettstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989 [1977]. pp. 481-563.
KRIPKE, S. “Naming and Necessity”. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980 [1972].
MAUNU, A. “Necessary a Posteriori Identity Truths: Fregeanism Beats Direct Reference Theory”. Axiomathes, 28, 2018. pp. 73-80.
RUSSELL, B. “On Denoting”. Mind, 14, 1905, pp. 479-93.
STALNAKER, R. “Assertion”. In: Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9: Pragmatics. Ed. P. Cole. New York: Academic Press, 1978. pp. 315-32. Reprinted in: Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. pp. 78-95.
STALNAKER, R. “Semantics for Belief”. Philosophical Topics, 15, 1987. Reprinted in: Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. pp. 117-29.
STALNAKER, R. “Assertion Revisited: On the Interpretation of Two-Dimensional Modal Semantics”. In: Two-Dimensional Semantics. Ed. M. Garcia-Carpintero & J. Macia. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. pp. 293-309.
YABLO, S. “No Fool’s Cold: Notes on Illusions of Possibility”. In: Two-Dimensional Semantics. Ed. M. Garcia-Carpintero & J. Macia. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Reprinted in:Thoughts: Papers on Mind, Meaning, and Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. pp. 151-70.
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Publicado
02-10-2020
Como Citar
MAUNU, A. ARE NECESSARY IDENTITIES EVER DISBELIEVED?. Revista Kriterion, [S. l.], v. 61, n. 145, 2020. Disponível em: https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/25650. Acesso em: 26 abr. 2024.
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