DEVERES COLETIVOS COMPLEXOS E ORIENTAÇÃO À AÇÃO
Palavras-chave:
Deveres coletivos, Orientação à ação, Coletivos não estruturados, Grupos-agentes, Pobreza mundial, Direitos humanosResumo
Em geral, podemos encontrar na literatura (tanto na popular
quanto na acadêmica) atribuições de deveres coletivos complexos a coletivos
não estruturados extensos de indivíduos. Por “deveres coletivos complexos”,
quero dizer deveres coletivos que, de maneira plausível, exigem que os membros
individuais de um coletivo não estruturado extenso empreguem tipos diferentes
de ações contributivas para alcançarem um objetivo coletivo – por exemplo,
o suposto dever coletivo universal de acabar com a pobreza mundial. Neste
artigo, defendo que esses deveres não orientam a ação. O motivo é por que
eles não passam no que chamo de “teste de orientação de ação”. Esse teste
pressupõe a crença intuitiva de que um dever moral orienta a ação apenas se,
para o portador do dever, estiver claro o tipo de ação que ele deve praticar após
a atribuição do dever. Deveres coletivos complexos atribuídos a coletivos não
estruturados extensos não passam nesse teste porque, embora cada portador
do dever (ou seja, cada membro do coletivo) receba orientação sobre o fim que
se deve atingir em conjunto, não está claro para esses agentes o tipo de ação
que cada um deles deve por em prática.
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