Desacuerdos profundos: ¿vale la pena seguir argumentando?
¿VALE LA PENA SEGUIR ARGUMENTANDO?
Keywords:
desacuerdos profundos, argumentos, stances epistémicas, perspectivas, epistemologíaAbstract
Deep disagreements are often seen as disagreements where we cannot achieve rational resolution, as they do not allow the production of arguments. We could then ask ourselves if there is any point in trying to make up arguments in these contexts. In this paper, I argue that, even if deep disagreements lack the conditions for producing genuine arguments, the attempts to produce arguments can still have a role in these discussions. I take the debate between scientific realists and anti-realists as a case study. I consider it to be rooted in a difference of epistemic stances, that is, a difference in the values and commitments that determine epistemic policies. I show why the disagreement between those who adopt different epistemic stances can be taken as a deep disagreement. I analyze the No Miracles Argument, one of the most frequent arguments in this debate, and state that, although arguments cannot solve the disagreement, they can have a valuable role in these contexts: they can reveal some intuitions of the opponent and that allows them to have a better understanding of their own stance.
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