Where is the Value of Knowledge?

Resumo

Knowledge is frequently said to be more valuable than true belief. Building upon this intuition, Zagzebski presents a challenge for definitions of knowledge. If a definition adequately captures knowledge, then it should also capture knowledge’s extra value. In this paper, I argue that the extra value can be accommodated with flexibility by definitions of knowledge. In other words, I state that epistemologists are capable of meeting the demands of the problem of value by identifying the extra value of knowledge in a variety of ways, such as by pointing to a valuable property that knowledge adds to the knower. This is not the way Zagzebski conceives the demands of the problem, and for that reason, I think she is mistaken. First, I introduce Zagzebski’s version of the problem and the three morals that she extracts from it. Second, I examine her argument and propose modifications based on what I believe to be a proper understanding of the background intuition. Third, I argue that Zagzebski’s morals do not really follow from the problem of value. Finally, I explore the consequences of being free from the three morals, namely, the possibility of locating the value of knowledge in different “places”.