MORAL DIVERSITY AND CAUSALLY POWERFUL MORAL PROPERTIES IN CORNELL REALISM
Palavras-chave:
Moral realism, Cornell realism, Explanatory irrelevance, Moral disagreement, Moral Twin EarthResumo
There are two important objections against moral realism: The objection of moral disagreement and the objection of the explanatory irrelevance of moral facts. Both objections aim to reject objective moral facts, so any realistic position must consider these objections. The ways in which these objections are constructed as well as the possible responses that can be given to them vary depending on the kind of moral realism in question. For this text, I consider how the two objections can be mobilized against Cornell's naturalist realism, as well as the responses available.
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