LOGICS OF REBASAMIENTO.

SUPERIOR EMPIRISM IN DELEUZE AND BERGSON

Abstract

This article explores the configuration of a superior empiricism in the early thought of Gilles Deleuze. Although, we will focus mainly on his reading of Bergson, the antecedent of Empirisme et subjetivité is crucial for our proposed objective, since both authors read by Deleuze
during the 50’s of the last century are in concepts and transversal problems in the domain of said empiricism. Among these concepts are that of habit, duration or tendency, which will be developed in our article, but nevertheless, we believe that it is in the notion of overrun (dépassement) where the essence of this empiricism is configured and that it has not been as a whole attended
to by Deleuzian commentators. This logic of overrun postulates that higher empiricism does not depend in the first instance on ordinary experience, that is, it is not an empiricism that deals with experience in a loose or simple sense. Rather, it will be about the overrun of said merely psychological experience and it is there also where the problem of conditions is fundamental for this empiricist
logic that will approach what Deleuze later calls “transcendental empiricism”.