WHAT ARE WE DOING WHEN WE SAY WHAT LAW IS? A BRIEF CRITIQUE OF ELIMINATIVISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
Uma breve crítica ao eliminativismo na Filosofia do Direito
Keywords:
Legal eliminativism. Doctrinal concept. Legal reasoning. Legal pragmaticsAbstract
The paper’s aim is to critically arrange two formulations of legal eliminativism: the pragmatic version and the methodological version. It is identified as a common feature of the two versions a general anti-metaphysical orientation that rejects abstractions about the grounds of law, prioritizing instead practical-normative considerations; as a distinctive feature of methodological eliminativism, it is emphasized the defense of strong conceptual pluralism and the rejection of conceptual analysis. In the following, two objections to the eliminative method in legal philosophy are presented, the first regarding the possibility of reconstructing a non-metaphysical doctrinal concept necessary to legal practice, and the second based on a pragmatist notion of experience as learning process. The conclusion is that legal eliminativism’s proposal, although auspicious, cannot do without the grounds of law questions, at the cost of missing important parts of the process of application and interpretation of legal concepts and the dynamics of the legal experience.
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