HUME’S MITIGATED SKEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO THE SYSTEMS OF REALITY

Authors

Keywords:

Mitigated skepticism, Double-existence theory, Realism, Hume

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that Hume’s commitment to mindindependent
objects is based on two types of realism or system of realities: (a) a
naïve realism based on an unjustified vulgar belief which identifies perceptions
and objects, and (b) a representational realism or philosophical system of doubleexistence.
Firstly, I emphasize that the philosophical question “Whether there
be body or not” cannot be considered a full case of unmitigated skepticism,
because Hume accepts a mitigated skepticism compatible with both vulgar and
representational realism. Furthermore, I argue that, while the vulgar belief in
bodies is based on an unjustified assent, the double-existence theory is based
on both an unjustified assent and a rationally justified assent (that corrects
the former). Considering all these points, I conclude that Hume’s mitigated
skepticism allows and requires a belief in or supposition of continued and distinct existences, and that this must, as a practical matter, take vulgar and philosophical forms at different times.

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References

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Published

2022-08-30

How to Cite

CAMPELO, W. de H. P. HUME’S MITIGATED SKEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO THE SYSTEMS OF REALITY. Revista Kriterion, [S. l.], v. 63, n. 152, 2022. Disponível em: https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/32611. Acesso em: 17 jul. 2024.

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