ENSAIO SOBRE UM PONTO DE VISTA EPISTÊMICO NÃO INDIVIDUALISTA ACERCA DA REFLEXÃO
AN ESSAY
Palabras clave:
Individualismo epistêmico, Justificação, ReflexãoResumen
Este ensaio visa motivar uma concepção epistêmica não individualista sobre a reflexão. A proposta é não individualista porque (a) não considera apenas o desempenho metacognitivo individual; (b) refere-se a uma situação em que duas ou mais pessoas estão em desacordo dialógico sobre o mesmo assunto ou alvo da proposta; (c) essas pessoas realizam uma disputa com base no espaço de conversação e têm o direito legítimo de esperar umas das outras o compromisso com a busca da verdade, evitar os erros e o entendimento. Chamo esta proposta de Perspectiva Dialética sobre Reflexão. Segundo essa perspectiva, reflexão é uma operação intelectual consciente e intencional por meio da qual uma pessoa toma conhecimento do conteúdo de crenças disputadas em uma troca dialógica ou interpessoal, envolvendo tanto suas próprias crenças quanto as crenças de seus interlocutores. Para essa proposta, a reflexão produz o bem epistêmico de evitar vícios epistêmicos e
promover a moderação epistêmica.
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