THE ROLE OF EXTERNALISM IN UNSAFE BUT RATIONAL REASONING
Palabras clave:
Externalism, Concepts, Rationality, Transitive inferenceResumen
Faria’s recent publication aims to show that “if antiindividualism
is correct, then the obscurity of validity is more widespread than
we need to assume for present purposes.” In rejecting “a variety of exculpating
moves, designed to shield the rationality of the possibly unlucky reasoner,” Faria
suggests that content externalism can drastically affect our self-understanding
as rational beings. I am afraid I have to disagree. Faria overintellectualizes
reasoning, always performed from the first-person perspective and is subject
to reflexive control by the reasoner. To be sure, content externalism shows that
sound reasoning is contingent on the broad environment and therefore does not
depend exclusively on the logical abilities of the living being but is a matter of
logical luck. Nonetheless, content externalism is no threat to rationality. My
diagnosis: By adopting Wittgenstein’s strategy of “bringing words back home,” Faria overlooks the achievements of cognitive science: in its simplest form,
“transitive inference,” rationality pervades the animal kingdom.
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