People, democracy and the an-archy of the political: a critique of constitutionalism based on Jacques Rancière

Abstract

The present paper aims to put in critical dialogue the tradition of constitutionalist thought and the notions of an-archic politics and democracy developed by Jacques Rancière in his works, through a common theme to both fields: the concept of "people". The aim is, on one hand, to discuss the essentialist and vague nature of this concept in legal theory, as the foundation of the constitutional order and the double of the state it constitutes, in theory. On the other hand, we present Rancière's elaborations around the existence of a "people" as a singular subjectivation that challenges and confounds the identification of the "people" as the totality of a social order composed of supposedly natural divisions and hierarchies. We conclude that Rancière's work points to the limits of constitutionalism as an alleged regime of uniformity and consensus, without, however, advocating for its total disregard. More than an exchange of paradigms, Rancière's democracy bets on a repoliticization of constituent moments as scenes of dissensus around the meaning and scope of the so-called "fundamental rights" and their subjects.