Law and coercion:
is there law where the use of force as sanction is not possible?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.69881/yp2ffj43Keywords:
Coercion, Concept of Law, JurisprudenceAbstract
The present work is developed from the fundamental question: is it possible to have Law without coercion? As such, it is built on an essentialist methodological basis whose assumptions are supported here based on the thesis elaborated by Julie Dickson. Coercion is understood as the possibility of using acts of force as a sanction by the legal system. Having clarified these methodological questions, in order to answer the question, we analyze, on the one hand, the coercitivist positions of John Austin and Hans Kelsen and, on the other hand, the non-coercitivist positions of Herbert Hart and Joseph Raz. This investigation will lead to some central points of the theories of these authors, demonstrating its direct relationship with the concept of Law. Then the arguments outlined are opposed and the position that best sustains itself in the light of a concept of Law that proves to be adequate according to the established methodological parameters is considered the winner. In the end, some considerations are made about what this answer allows us to conclude.
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