Responsibility for tortius acts resulting in death

a few philosophical contributions

Abstract

The responsibility for tortious acts resulting in death, via monetary compensation, is an undeniable facet of the Brazilian legal system. This compensation can be shaped as a reparation for the loss of life, due to the dead person’s own right, and/or it can mean reparation for the loved ones, in response to the fact that they lost someone they cared for. Although certainly fair, it’s possible to raise a few questions regarding its theoretical foundations. The focus of the paper is to understand how the category of death-as-damages, through its formulation as an instance of direct and indirect damages, can be viewed as adequate in light of the philosophical debate regarding the badness of death. The hypothesis defended is that, after reviewing Epicurus’ account of death and the deprivation account as its response, an interpretation that expressly admits the paradoxical nature of death-as-damages and supports a certain way of understanding Epicurus can provide the necessary implications so that death-as-damages, in a juridical sense, is not negated by its philosophical contributions.