SENSE OF AGENCY DOES NOT SUPPORT ANTI-REDUCTIONIST THEORIES OF ACTION
Palavras-chave:
sensação de agência, modelo comparador, seleção de ação, controle, reducionismoResumo
Teorias da Ação Anti-reducionistas são, de modo geral, explicações para ações de acordo com as quais o papel que o agente desempenha na produção de sua ação não pode ser reduzido aos seus eventos e estados mentais. Proponentes dessas teorias apresentam afirmações de acordo com as quais as Teorias da Ação Anti-reducionistas capturam a sensação de agência que agentes experienciam quando empreendem uma ação intencional melhor do que a concorrente Teoria Causal da Ação. Investigaremos os argumentos que apoiam essas afirmações e defenderemos que eles não sobrevivem ao escrutínio, especialmente quando levamos em consideração a informação neuro-cognitiva disponível a respeito da sensação de agência. Teorias da Ação Anti-reducionistas parecem incompatíveis com a explicação empírica da sensação de agência, como mostram experimentos focados na seleção de ações, no modelo comparador e na percepção da relação entre ação e seu resultado. Já a Teoria Causal da Ação é mais capaz de acomodar e explicar a sensação de agência.
Downloads
Referências
AGUILAR, J. “Basic Causal Deviance, Action Repertoires, and Reliability”. Philosophical Issues, 22(01), 2012, pp. 1-19.
BARLAS, Z., OBHI, S. “Freedom, Choice, and the Sense of Agency”. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7(514), 2013, pp. 1-7.
BAYNE, T., LEVY, N. “The Feeling of Doing: Deconstructing the Phenomenology of Agency”. In: N. Sebanz, W. Prinz (ed.). Disorders of Volition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006. pp. 49-68.
BECK, B., DI COSTA, S., HAGGARD, P. “Having Control Over The External World Increases The Implicit Sense of Agency”. Cognition, 162(201705), 2017, pp. 54-60.
BRATMAN, M. “Two Faces of Intention”. The Philosophical Review, 93(3), 1984, pp. 375-405.
CHAMBON, V., HAGGARD, P. “Sense of Control Depends on Fluency of Action Selection, Not Motor Performance”. Cognition, 125(3), 2012, pp. 441-451.
CHISHOLM, Roderick. “Human Freedom and the Self”. In: G. Watson (ed.). Free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964. pp. 24-35.
CLARKE, Randolph. “Agent Causation”. In: T. O’Connor, C. Sandis (eds.). A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. pp. 218-226.
DAVIDSON, D. “Actions, Reasons and Causes”. Journal of Philosophy, 60(23), 1963, pp. 685-700.
DEERY, O. “Why People Believe in Indeterminist Free Will”. Philosophical Studies, 172(8), 2014, pp. 2033-2054.
DEUTSCH, M. “The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method”. Oxford, MA: MIT Press, 2015.
ENÇ, B. “How We Act: Causes, Reasons and Intentions”. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
FEINBERG, I. “Efference Copy and Corollary Discharge: Implications for Thinking and Its Disorders”. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 4(4), 1978, pp. 636-640.
FRITH, C. “Explaining Delusions of Control: The Comparator Model 20 Years On”. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(1), 2012, pp. 52-54.
GALLAGHER, S. “Multiple Aspects in the Sense of Agency”. New Ideas in Psychology, 30(1), 2012, pp. 15-31.
GINET, C. “Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency”. The Journal of Ethics, 1(1), 1997, pp. 85-98.
GRÜNBAUM, T. “The Feeling of Agency Hypothesis: A Critique”. Synthese, 192(10), 2015, pp. 3313-3337.
HAGGARD, P. “Sense of Agency in the Human Brain”. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 18(4), 2017, pp. 196-207.
HAGGARD, P., CLARK, S. “Intentional Action: Conscious Experience and Neural Prediction”. Consciousness and Cognition, 12(4), 2003, pp. 695-707.
HIERONYMI, P. “The Will as Reason”. Philosophical Perspectives, 23(1), 2009, pp. 201-220.
IMAIZUMI, S., TANNO, Y. “Intentional Binding Coincides with Explicit Sense of Agency”. Consciousness and Cognition, 67, 2019, pp. 1-15.
LIBET, B. “Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8(04), 1985 pp. 529.
LOWE, E. J. “Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action”. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
KNOBE, J., NICHOLS, S. “Experimental Philosophy”. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
MELE, A. “Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior”. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
MOORE, J., HAGGARD, P. “Awareness of Action: Inference and Prediction”. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(1), 2008, pp. 136-144.
MYLOPOULOS, M. “Agentive Awareness Is Not Sensory Awareness”. Philosophical Studies, 172(3), 2015, pp. 761-780.
MYLOPOULOS, Myrto, SHEPHERD, Joshua. “Agentive Phenomenology”. In: U. Kriegel (ed.). Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming.
NIDA-RÜMELIN, M. “Doing and Subject Causation”. Erkenntnis, 67(2), 2007, pp. 255-272.
O’CONNOR, Timothy. “Agent Causation”. In: T. O’Connor (ed.). Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. pp. 173-200.
O’CONNOR, T. “Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Freewill”. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
O’CONNOR, T. “Agent Causal Power”. In: T. Handfield (ed.). Dispositions and Causes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. pp. 189-214.
PACHERIE, E. “The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework”. Cognition, 107(1), 2008, pp. 179-217.
PEREBOOM, D. “The Phenomenology of Agency and Deterministic Agent Causation”. In: H. Pedersen, M. Altman (eds.). Horizons and Authenticity in Phenomenology, Existentialism, and Moral Psychology. New York: Springer, 2015. pp. 277-294.
SCHROETER, F. “Endorsement and Autonomous Agency”. Philosophy and Philosophical Research, 69(3), 2004, pp. 633-659.
SHEPHERD, J. “The Contours of Control”. Philosophical Studies, 170(3), 2014, pp. 395-411.
SMITH, B. “The Nature of Sensory Experience: The Case of Taste and Tasting”. Phenomenology and Mind Online Journal, 2013, pp. 292-313.
SYNOFZIK, M., VOSGERAU, G., NEWEN, A. “I Move, Therefore I Am: A New Theoretical Framework to Investigate Agency and Ownership”. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(2), 2008, pp. 411-424.
WEN, W., HAGGARD, P. “Prediction Error and Regularity Detection Underlie Two Dissociable Mechanisms for Computing the Sense of Agency”. Cognition, 195, 2020, pp. 104074.
WENKE, D., FLEMING, S., HAGGARD, P. “Subliminal Priming of Actions Influences Sense of Control Over Effects of Action”. Cognition, 115(1), 2010, pp. 26-38.
WOLPERT, D. M. “Computational Approaches to Motor Control”. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 1(6), 1997, pp. 209-216.
