DREAMS, IMAGINATIONAND SKEPTICISM
Keywords:
Dreams, Skepticism, Imagination, Pretend, FictionAbstract
In several well-known papers, Ernest Sosa has argued, contrary to the orthodox model of dreaming, that dreaming is like imagining: when I dream that p I have sensory images as if p were the case, and propositionally I imagine that p. In other words, I simulate the experience of p. Under this model, the experience of dreaming is more like that of fiction, and, in Sosa's view, it does not endanger the stability of my perceptual beliefs. My purpose in this contribution is to show that, contrary to what Sosa and others argue, it is not clear that the imagination-based model of dreaming has the anti-skeptical consequences they suppose. Specifically, the cases concerning the cognitive phenomenon of simulation that will be the subject of my consideration will show that there is no immediate reflexive and transparent access to our beliefs that would secure them against the possibility of skeptical scenarios.
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