Metaphysical Problems of Re-Enactment: New Perspectives on Collingwood's Philosophy of History

Nuevas perspectivas sobre la filosofía de la historia de R. G. Collingwood

Abstract

1. G. Collingwood’s conception of history is structured around two fundamental theses: that all history is the history of thought, and that the historian must re-enact past thoughts. Conceived as conditions of possibility for historical knowledge, these theses have provoked divergent interpretations and sustained criticism. One of the central issues in this debate concerns the nature and possibility of re-enacting the original act of thought. While authors such as Dray, D’Oro, and Robson have defended readings that emphasize, respectively, the rational force, inferential patterns, or continuant character of thought, Eric Levy has challenged the theory, describing it as a “metaphysical sinkhole” within Collingwood’s philosophy of history. Against these positions, this paper argues that the theory of re-enactment must be examined in light of both Collingwood’s metaphysics and his philosophy of mind. On this basis, the article proposes a transcendental reading of re-enactment, understanding it as a reflection on the constitution of the historical object by the knowing subject. Within this framework, it evaluates the viability of a conception of re-enactment that, while acknowledging its metaphysical commitments, avoids the aporias highlighted by contemporary criticism.