KANT, FREEDOM AND THE HERMENEUTICS OF FAILURE

Abstract

In this paper I attempt to show how an important traditional line of interpretation of Kantian philosophy went astray by the fact that Kant works in its practical philosophy with two distinct and apparently conflicting conceptions of the freedom of human will, namely, freedom as noumenal causality and freedom as the power of choice between alternative possibilities. Firstly, I argue that no conception of freedom in Kant`s philosophy can possibly conflict with that asserted in his most foundational works on practical philosophy, which defines freedom as the actual exercise of moral rationality. I next endeavor to show, by means of both textual and conceptual arguments, the inconsistency of the dominant adoption of a wrong version of the second alternative, namely that of freedom of choice as a supposed free power of choosing for or against morality. Finally, I defend that the only consistent way of conceiving of Kant`s freedom of choice in accordance with his freedom as the actual exercise of morality reveals a real conceptual difficulty in Kant`s practical philosophy, namely, the problem of the accountability of immoral decisions. The guiding-thread of this exposition is an interpretation of Karl Ameriks`s article of 2002: “Pure Reason of Itself Alone Suffices to Determine the Will”.