ARE THE SIMPLEST BODIES AND THE SUBSTANCE INDIVIDUALS IN SPINOZA’S PHILOSOPHY?
Keywords:
Spinoza, Individual, Simplest bodies, SubstanceAbstract
The present article analyzes the notions of simplest bodies and substance in the light of the definition of individual as presented in the physical digression of the second part of Spinoza's Ethics. Our goal is to clarify the relationship between the notions of individual, simplest bodies
and substance. Our hypothesis is that neither the simplest bodies nor the substance can be considered individuals. In order to do this, the work will be divided into two parts: the first one concerns the approach of the simplest bodies, the second, the approach of substance. At the end, final considerations will be outlined.
References
AGUILAR, C. “El modo infinito que es un individuo: la faz de todo el universo en la filosofía de Spinoza”. Contrastes, 26, 2, 2021, pp. 7-23.
AGUILAR, C. “Individuo como cosa singular. Los dos sentidos de acción en la Ética de Spinoza”. Éndoxa: Series Filosóficas, UNED, 51, 2023, pp. 65-81.
BALIBAR, E. (1993). “Spinoza: de la individualidad a la transindividualidad”. Córdoba: Brujas, 2009.
DELEUZE, G. (1981). “En medio de Spinoza”. 2da ed. Buenos Aires: Cactus, 2008.
DELEUZE, G. (1968). “Spinoza y el problema de la expresión.” Barcelona: Muchnik, 1999.
GARRET, D. “Spinoza’s Theory of Metaphysical Individuation”. En Barber, K. Y Gracia, J. (eds.). Individuation in Early Modern Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.
KIZUK. S. “Individuation and individuality: a reading of Spinoza’s physical interlude”, Masters thesis, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2014.
LACHTERMAN, D. “The physics of Spinoza’s Ethics. En: Shahan, R. y Biro, J. (eds.). Spinoza: new perspectives. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978, pp. 71-111.
LAVERAN, S. Le “Concours des Parties: Critique de l’atomisme et redéfinition du singulier chez Spinoza”. París: Classiques Garnier, 2015.
MACHEREY, P. “Introduction à l’Éthique de Spinoza. La deuxième partie. La réalité mentale”. París: PUF, 1997.
MATHERON, A. “Individu et Communauté chez Spinoza”. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1969.
NARVÁEZ, M. “La naturaleza y la función de las definiciones en la Ética de Spinoza”. Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía, 32, 1, 2019, pp. 65-85.
PETERMAN, A. “The «Physical» Interlude”. En Melamed, Y. (ed.), Spinoza’s Ethics. A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
RAVVEN, H. “Spinoza‘s Path from Imaginative Transindividuality to Intuitive Relational Autonomy: From Fusion, Confusion and Fragmentation to Moral Integrity”.
En Armstrong, Aurelia; Green, Keith y Sangiacomo, Andrea (eds.); Spinoza and Relational Autonomy. Being with Others. Edimburgo: Edinburgh University Press, 2019.
RIBEIRO FERREIRA, M. L. “«Um verme no sangue»: considerações sobre a relação Todo/partes na filosofia de Espinosa”, Revista de Filosofía. Universidad Iberoamericana, 133, 2012, pp. 57-81.
SCHMALTZ, T. “Spinoza’s Mereology”. En Melamed, Y. (ed.). A Companion to Spinoza. Hoboken: Blackwell, 2021.
SACKSTEDER, W. “Spinoza on Part and Whole: The Worm’s Eye View”. The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 8, 3, 1977, pp. 139-159.
SPINOZA, B. “Opera quae supersunt omnia”, Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, editada por Gebhardt, C., 4 tomos, Heidelberg: Carl Winter–Verlag, 1925. Tomo I: Korte Verhandeling van God, De Mensch en des zelfs Welstand, Renati Des Cartes Principiorum philosophiae pars I [en] II, Cogitata metaphysica, Compendium grammatices linguae Hebraeae. Tomo II: Tractatus de intellectus emendatione, Ethica. Tomo III: Tractatus theologico–politicus, Adnotationes ad Tractatum theologico–politicum, Tractatus politicus. Tomo IV: Epistolae.
SPINOZA, B. (1677). “Ética demostrada según el orden geométrico”, trad. por A. Domínguez, Salamanca: Escolar y Mayo Editores, 2019.
WINKLER, S. “The Conatus of the Body in Spinoza’s Physics”. Society and Politics, 2, 2016, pp. 95-114.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2025 Revista Kriterion
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
