EXISTENCE REQUIREMENT, WORLD-INDEXED PROPERTIES, AND CONTINGENT APRIORI

Autores/as

Palabras clave:

Existence requirement, World-indexed properties , Contingent apriori, Necessity, @-transform

Resumen

The article is dedicated to the argument against the Existence
Requirement provided by Takashi Yagisawa. We argue that the core of Yagisawa`s
argument – the Strong Iterability – cannot be inferred from the idea of contingent
apriori (Kripke), and is incompatible with the idea of @-transform (Plantinga).
Thus, these ideas, contrary to Yagisawa, cannot serve as a methodological
basis of the Strong Iterability. We also argue that the Strong Iterability is
incompatible with the Constituent Principle. Finally, we show that the concept
of world-indexed properties (the argument of Yagisawa relies on the idea of
world-indexed properties) is inconsistent, and even if the defender of Strong
Iterability can resist this objection, the Strong Iterability must be given up.

Descargas

Los datos de descargas todavía no están disponibles.

Citas

BERGMANN, M. “A new argument from actualism to serious actualism”. NOÛS, 30, 1996, pp. 356-59.

CAPLAN, B. “A new defence of the modal existence requirement”. Synthese, 154, 2007, pp. 335-343.

CHIHARA, C. “The worlds of possibility. Modal realism and the semantics of modal logic”. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.

DUZI, M., JESPERSEN, B., MATERNA, P. “Procedural Semantics for Hyperintensional Logic. Foundations and Applications of Transparent Intensional Logic”. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Volume 17. Springer. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, New York, 2010.

FINE, K. “Prior on the construction of possible worlds and instants”. Modality and tense: philosophical papers, pp. 133–175. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005.

GREGORY, D. “B is Innocent”. Analysis, 61.3, 2001, pp. 229-236.

GRIM, P. “There is no set of all truths”. Analysis, 1984, pp. 206-208.

______. “The Incomplete Universe. Totality, Knowledge, and Truth”. A Bradford Book MIT, 1991.

HAUSMANN, M. “Against Kripke’s Solution to the Problem of Negative Existentials”. Analysis, 79.3, 2019, pp. 411-415.

KRIPKE, S. “Naming and Necessity”. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.

______. “Vacuous Names and Fictional Entities”. Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, 1, 2011, pp. 52-74.

______. “Reference and Existence: The 1973 John Locke Lectures”. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

MACKIE, J. “The Miracle of Theism”. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982.

McCARTHY, A., PHILLIPS, I. “No New Argument against the Existence Requirement”. Analysis, 66, 2006, pp. 39–44.

MIROIU, A. “Actuality and World-Indexed Sentences”. Studia Logica, 63, 1999, pp. 311-330.

______. “World-Indexed Sentences and Modality”. Logique & Analyse, 48, 2005, pp. 209-221.

PLANTINGA, A. “World and Essense”. The Philosophical Review, 79 (4), 1970, pp. 461-492.

______. “The Nature of Necessity”. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974.

______. “Actualism and Possible Worlds”. Theoria, 42.1-3, 1976, pp.139-160.

______.“On Existentialism”. Philosophical Studies, 44.1, 1983, pp. 1–20.

______. (1979). “De Essentia”. In: Alvin Plantinga. Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 139-157.

PLANTINGA, A., GRIM, P. “Truth, Omniscience, and Cantorian Argument: an Exchange”. Philosophical Studies, 71, 1993, pp. 267-306.

POLLOCK, J. “The Foundations of Philosophical Semantics”. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

SENNETT, J. “Universe Indexed Properties and the Fate of the Ontological Argument”.

Religious Studies, 27.1, 1991, pp. 65-79.

STEPHANOU, Y.“Necessary Beings”. Analysis, 60, 2000, pp. 188–93.

______.“Serious Actualism”. The Philosophical Review, 116 (2), 2007, pp. 219-250.

______. “An Argument for Existentialism”. Acta Analytica, 35.4, 2020, pp. 507-520.

WILLIAMSON, T. “Necessary Existents”. Logic, Thought and Language, edited by A. O’Hear, pp. 233-251. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

YAGISAWA, T. “A new argument against the existence requirement”. Analysis, 65, 2005, pp. 39–42.

______.“Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise”. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Descargas

Publicado

2022-08-30

Cómo citar

BONDAR, O. EXISTENCE REQUIREMENT, WORLD-INDEXED PROPERTIES, AND CONTINGENT APRIORI. Revista Kriterion, [S. l.], v. 63, n. 152, 2022. Disponível em: https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/33257. Acesso em: 17 jul. 2024.

Número

Sección

Artigos