CONTEXTUALISMO RADICAL NEO-FREGEANO
Palabras clave:
indexicalismo, pragmatismo veritativo-condicional, contextualismo radical, neo-fregeanismoResumen
Recanati cuestiona lo que caracteriza como la concepción fregeana del significado acudiendo a casos de variabilidad semántica propuestos por Searle y Travis. De acuerdo con él, el pragmatismo veritativo-condicional – postura que sitúa la influencia del contexto sobre significados convencionales bajo el marco de funciones pragmáticas – acomoda mejor estos casos dado el objetivo de proveer una teoría veritativo-condicional del significado. En contraste con esta aproximación, Recanati caracteriza el contextualismo radical como una posición de acuerdo con la cual el fenómeno de variabilidad semántica es persistente e incompatible con la postulación de significados literales. De acuerdo con él dado que el contextualismo radical es contrario a la postulación de significados literales, tal postura es también incompatible con la postulación de sentidos fregeanos. Esta visión es tan antagónica con relación a la concepción neo-fregeana de sentidos fregeanos que merece la pena ser revisada.
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