DE DESCARTES A FREGE

OS AVANÇOS EPISTEMOLÓGICOS DO MÉTODO

Abstract

The present article is intended to superficially expose some
epistemological advances on the use of the method to reach a scientific truth, considering
the punctual perspectives of Descartes, Bacon and Hobbes throughout modernity. Both
the method proposed by René Descartes (1596-1650) and Francis Bacon (1561-1625)
aimed primarily at guiding the proper use of reason and senses in epistemological
processes. From the good use of reason, in the Cartesian case, and both in the case of the
Baconian, we obtain solid foundations for the investigation of truths, especially those that
correspond to science. With Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes (1558-1679) we will see
advances in the epistemological use of the method, yet still insufficient to deal with what
we will call the "problem of epistemic space." However, we will try to argue that the
greatest innovations about the epistemological use of the method were actually made by
Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) in his Ideography. From this, we will demonstrate how we
can consider Fregean conception as a kind of "continuity" of the Cartesian method.