The Dissolution of the Antagonism Between Freedom and Determinism: Nietzsche’s Compatibilist Contribution

Abstract

This paper analyzes the free will problem in Nietzsche’s philosophy,
especially in his later writings (1885-1889). I believe that such problem appears in the
form of an antagonism between: (i) the criticism and determinist approach towards the
existence of a freedom to do otherwise in human action; and, (ii) Nietzsche’s use of
positive notions of freedom and responsibility. The issue at stake comes from the
simultaneous statement of (i) and (ii), how can Nietzsche criticize so heavily the
concepts of freedom and responsibility and still use them in his positive agenda?
Nevertheless, inspired in Wolfgang Müller-Lauter methodology, I intent to show that
such antagonism is not essential, but merely an apparent one. It will be seen that Nietzsche’s notion of freedom is compatible with determinism, for it enhances the active
role of the “subject” as a “piece of fatefulness”, being himself at the same time
determined and determining for the whole. When Nietzsche eliminates the separation
between “subject” and world, he dissolves the antagonism between freedom and
determinism, and from such compatibilism arises an interesting notion of “responsible
freedom”, for the “subject” is no longer “the owner” of his actions – as it was under the
freedom to do otherwise paradigm – but is responsible for it, and for its repercussion in
the whole.