The (in)aplicability of willful blindness theory in money laundering crimes

Abstract

This article seeks to analyse the possibility or not of applying the theory of willful blindness to the imputation of money laundering crimes. Methodologically, bibliographical research on doctrine, legislation and jurisprudence was used to analyse the growing need to combat the crime of money laundering and the use of the theory of willful blindness for this purpose. Thus, the classic conception of the subjective element as will and knowledge is discussed, as well as the distinctions between intent and guilt. From this, the article explores theBrazilian jurisprudence and how the doctrine of willful blindness was exported to Brazil, especially in cases of great relevance, such as Penal Action 470, known as “Mensalão”, to think about the possibilities of widening the possible intent for the imputation of the crimes of money laundering when the cognitive element is absent. Finally, the focus of the study turns to the impossibility of applying wilful blindness to the imputation of money laundering crimes due to the violation of the principles of legality and culpability, given the characterization of guilt in the application of the theory and the absence of provision law of guilty money laundering.