LOGICAL KNOWLEDGE ANDORDINARY REASONING
MORE THANCONSIDERING, LESS THAN BELIEVING
Keywords:
Logical knowledge, Logical Consequence, Dispositionalism, Logical constants, Epistemic normsAbstract
In her article “Logical knowledge and ordinary reasoning”, Besson (2012) has argued that the dispositional notion of logical knowledge is doomed to failure. As a response, Steinberger and Murzi (2013) suggested a new criterion of logical knowledge, which seems to avoid the objections by Besson. In this paper, I argue that this new approach is wrong, for the demands that it imposes over the agent are too weak. Then, I develop a modified criterion which is not affected by most of the objections.
References
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