Outra Margem: revista de filosofia

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Vol. 4 No. 7 (2017): 2º Semestre de 2017

A A SUBJETIVIDADE ESTÁ EM OUTRO LUGAR: SOBRE A NOÇÃO SARTREANA DE IPSEIDADE FUNDAMENTAL

Submitted
March 28, 2026
Published
2019-06-03 — Updated on 2026-03-29
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Abstract

Is that which makes me “who I really am” and that renders my experiences mine something like “a part of me”? Is it a property of my being? Is it something that can be accessed by me in first-person? The French philosopher JeanPaul Sartre believed that the “self” is something that only takes part on one’s reflexive experiences, so that in much of one's conscious life (in the so-called pre-reflective experiences) there is nothing that qualifies as an “I” that renders those experiences hers. But if the “self” is only present in reflective experiences, what is it that gives to my prereflective experiences the instantaneous, seemingly intrinsic notion, sensation, or certainty that they are mine? This article makes a brief walkthrough into the intricacies of these questions.

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