LEIBNIZ E A CRÍTICA AO ESPAÇO TOTA SIMUL NEWTONIANO: A MÔNADA COMO CAUSA IMEDIATA DO MOVIMENTO

Abstract

In this article we intended to recompose the argument that sustains the
critic of Leibniz the notion of Newtonian space tota simul, in order to show that, according
to the Leibnizian presupposition, the real immediate cause of the movement should live
in the true notion of substance or Monad and no, as it defended Newton, in the notion of
a space totally similar and undiscernible. According to the German philosopher, the
notion of a space that possesses reality per se would be implicated in the impossibility of
the correct characterization of movement of the bodies, position that this notion would
violate the principles of sufficient reason and of the identity of the undiscernible. In this
sense, the foundation of movement would not be in the existence of an absolute space,
but in the intrinsic registration of the change and of the movement for the individualized
apperception of the Monad