Volume 1, No. 12º Semestre de 2014

Em entrevista exclusiva concedida por e-mail para a Outramargem, revista de filosofia, em julho de 2014, Paulo Margutti revela que passou boa parte de sua vida dedicado a um modelo de atividade filosófica no qual não mais acredita; contesta a autoimagem negativa da comunidade filosófica brasileira, que tem raízes na aplicação de critérios europeus etnocêntricos na avaliação da maneira pela qual fazemos filosofia nesse país; defende que a filosofia brasileira tem de ser buscada em nossa própria história cultural, com todas as suas especificidades e peculiaridades, sem ser avaliada com base nos critérios europeus ocidentais; e, apesar de tudo o que já foi percorrido, ele confirma que os projetos não param. Confira a entrevista.

This paper aims at an examination of the meaning of the well-known arendtian thesis that throughout modernity “the thread of tradition is broken”. We want to suggest that this rupture cannot be duly understood without reference to the “remembrance of the past”.

The hereby presented in this text address to the contextualization of an important work of one of the most relevant French illuminists philosophers: Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men (1754). It was aimed to establish a relation between the author, the work and the current thinking that took place during the French Enlightenment, reaching an understanding of the publication on that days and what are the possible reflects of it in the contemporaneity.

This article examines Paul Ricoeur’s ideas of otherness and desire. Both play a significant role in Ricoeur’s philosophy in general, and in his hermeneutics of the self in Oneself as Another in particular. The thesis I defend in this article is that desire for otherness is nevertheless a blind spot in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self. In order to defend this thesis I will examine Ricoeur’s triadic understanding of the other in the final chapter of Oneself as Another and in his essay “Multiple Étrangeté.” I will argue that in his triadic understanding of otherness, Ricoeur clearly describes three different experiences of the other affecting the capable self in talking, acting, narrating and being responsible, i.e., the experience of the world affecting the flesh, the experience of compassion for other people in relations of solicitude, and the experience of the other that is the inner voice of conscience. I will further argue that Ricoeur’s understanding of otherness nevertheless insufficiently describes the experience of desire for otherness in the particular sense of the self’s attraction to otherness, which is different from these three experiences and which is nevertheless a significant experience for understanding the self’s capacity to talk, act, narrate and take responsibility.

The objective is to situate the place of ethics within the dichotomy individual - crowd. The main idea proposes an alternative reading for the clash between two interpretative traditions of this theme in Kierkegaard. i.e. 1) both for those who advocate a reconciliation between the philosopher of Copenhagen with idealists Kant and Hegel (who are thinkers who move in Kierkegaard's work), 2) and for offering a deep divergence between Kierkegaard and any ethical commitment. In contrast to both interpretive vectors in kierkegaardian's literature, we intend to show that ethics, for the Danish philosopher, occupies a necessary place, but insufficient with regard to the transition from mass- individual, that is falling short ethics for singular Individual beyond it. To sustain such an argument is essential to refer kierkegaardian's discussion of the stages, which is the foundation by which the thread runs through this reflection.

This paper aims to analyze Michel Foucault’s thinking about the notions of author and work, which are regarded as variable and complex functions of discourse. The first part of the paper connects the notion of author with the problem of subjectivity and the order of discourse. In the second part, the aim is to stress how the same question appears in other works of Foucault, when he analyzes the kinds of circulation and appropriation of discourses, both in ancient times as well as during his time (in relation to his own ‘works’).

In this text we discuss the conceptual character of the “free spirit”, to which Nietzsche dedicated his second published book. We address the nietzschean claim that freedom of spirit features a kind of “relative” freedom. We make use of John Richardson's concept of “self selection” in order to interpretate the ethics of self care (Epimeleia) developed by Nietzsche in the context of the philosophy of the free spirit. We approach the role of science in the construction of a kind of spiritual and intellectual diet characteristic of the free spirit's way of life, and the role of this character in the philosophic program of Human, all too human.

The young Schelling’s philosophy is characterized by the attempt to rethink, in an original manner, some ideas that have been elaborated throughout the philosophical tradition. The Leonberg philosopher reinterprets the Fichtean Tathandlung (act), Spinoza’s natura naturans (nature as endowed with self-productivity), Kant’s transcendental freedom. The focus of our paper lies in the connection between freedom and idea, by means of which we aim to reveal how Schelling sometimes is loyal to Kant, and sometimes criticizes him, in an attempt to develop a criticism that does not fall in the unsettling points in criticism such as elaborated by Kant himself. Texts from 1795-1796 will be the focus of this research, and support will be looked for in Kant and interpreters of Schelling.

The aim of this text is to ponder over the constitution of the kósmos in Timaeus and of the elements that enable to think the constitution of human being; hence, therefrom, we shall conceive which parts configure the composition of aísthesis, this the way that enables human being to perceive the things from yourself, he as being therefore the result of the relations that compose the totality. However, we will not discuss the aísthesis in its general aspect, rather only in its afective one. In other words, we try to understand how one can relate the sensible to the inteligible in the constitution of the physical aspect of aísthesis.

Recently, new research projects on war and international conflict propose to re-examine violence from the angle of Axel Honneth’s theory of the Struggle for Recognition. This article aims to present, in the first place, a general outline of this theory. Secondly, this article proposes several elements that should be taken into account when applying Honneth’s theory to the analysis of armed conflicts.

Starting from the idea that many of the precepts of Kantian aesthetics can be seen as an important tool for analysis of contemporary cultural production, we highlight the critical and reflective aspects of Kantian judgment of taste to distinguish it, as Kant proceeds in its 3rd critical of the determinants judgments. These judgments, mainly linked to knowledge activity, are marked within the Kantian transcendental structure, by necessity and objectivity of their statements to the extent that just refer to what is necessarily provided by the transcendental subject in the constitution of experience. However, the own Kantian transcendental analysis of the structures that make up the experience of knowledge finds limits, and this is the case of the doctrine of schematism. It is precisely here where the review undertaken by the Frankfurt thinkers appears. We found in several texts of Adorno, Horkheimer and Benjamin the idea that the very ways in which the subject constitutes your experience are themselves conditioned by instances which escape the subject. The cinema as a mere industrial product, appear in these authors as one of these instances. We believe, however, that the very way in which the activity of schematize acts in the Kantian judgment of taste can point to other possibilities.