Volume 4, No. 72º Semestre de 2017

The constitutive genesis of the normative program of critical theory is self-understood as interdisciplinary. Among the various constitutional knowledges in critical research, social philosophy has its specific place as that knowledge aimed at the social world with a telos to emancipation. Emancipation is understood as identified, analyzed and attempted to solve the social pathologies. Such approach allows an ontological-social point of view contained in social philosophy to emancipate forms of emancipation enabling the process of social realization of social institutions. In this paper I aim to explicit that the normative program of a social philosophy linked to a social-ontological approach is based on a social-political background linked to a specific form of institution and, in this case, reflect upon social project “Mais IDH” (MA/Brasil) whose challenge is a promotion of social effectiveness. 

While it is true to say that there was a formation through theater, in Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship, it is also true that such formation does not culminate in the character’s ideals of youth, namely, becoming the creator of a national theater and being able to live from his art. Instead, there is the abandonment of the theatrical universe. This article intends to demonstrate that this abandonment can be understood not as the end of the formative years, but rather as the overflow of the dramatic poetry
that puts the novel in the day’s agenda. This means that due to the emptying of a tragic poetic and the lack of a court theater (in Germany) it raises the question of novel within the Goethian novel itself at a crucial moment in which Shakespeare is discussed. It is in this perspective that this article will try to demonstrate that the dilemma of theatrical form will lead, from the English playwright, to an overflow of subjectivity in front of the spectacle while the dilemma of formation is solved by the individual’s adjustment to
concrete social reality.

The text intends to develop a Reading about the relation between the concepts of “Intention” and “Freedom” by a historical standpoint; from the treatment of such concepts in the work of Anselmo f Cantlebury to the readings of his Works in modernity by Franz Brentano, Edmond Husserl e Jean-Paul Sartre, that in his own way representes a recoveryof notionspresent in the anselmian ethics. By that way we will analyze the mutual developmentof such concepts, , and their relationship,throughout the ocidental philosophical thinking.

With this paper we intend to present some aspects of the relationship between philosophy and science in Heidegger’s thought. The reflexion on the limits of science as a human behavior and its roots in a deeper ontological ground always occupied an important place in Heidegger’s work. In Being and Time the author connects the scientific behavior to a theoretical and objective visualization and demonstrates the derivative character of this theoretical visualization itself with regard to a more immediate contact to beings. The philosophy, on the other side, is also structured as a theoretical behavior, but it would have, as a distincitve feature, a tendency to the contemplation of the world in a totality. What this distinction implicates to the relationship between philosophy and science and in what extent the second finds its ontological fundaments in the first will be treated in this work. Lastly, we intend to indicate that the idea of the ontological difference between being (Sein) und beings (Seienden) is the ground of the relationship between philosophy and science.

The main objective of this article is the problem of suffering in the philosophy of Simone Weil (1909-1943). Its purpose is to address the core aspects according to which it forms in the scope of Weilian thought, in order to culminate in the assimilation of suffering as a pathos. The itinerary that will be profitable to use to facilitate this design begins with the characterization of the conception of the French philosopher about the nature of philosophy. This will make it possible to understand her determination to participate in the working condition, where the main elements that break up into the Weilian concept of suffering were constituted. It is therefore pertinent to elucidate the concept of malheur, which is decisive for the subject in question, and subsequently to go through the reconfiguration of the problem of suffering in Weil through his contact with Christianity and the experience of grace.

The advent of the sophists (σοφιστής) in the intellectual scene of the ancient world is what propels Plato's philosophy by charging him with a sophisticated philosophical elaboration. We propose to make some considerations about the controversial figure of the sophists: Protagoras and Gorgias and the not very friendly reactions of Socrates and Plato. We will approach the themes of 'truth' (ἀλήθεια) and relativism, 'rhetoric' (ῥητορική) and 'skepticism', which we consider fundamental for an initial contact with these thinkers who although vilified by part of the tradition, contributed significantly to the cultural and political effervescence of the fifth and fourth centuries BC and that still today arouse diverse interests in philosophical research.

This article aims to show, in general lines, the hermeneutical process’ development since Judaism until Martin Heidegger´s thought. To accomplish that, we show the methods of interpretation from Judaism, passing through Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Schleiermacher and Dilthey’s proposals. In these back and forth of the hermeneutical process that endures until now, to consider the contributions from theses authors is something important, since it is possible to realize a passage from a hermeneutics that focuses only on the text to a hermeneutics that considers the presence of a human being in the world.

Is that which makes me “who I really am” and that renders my experiences mine something like “a part of me”? Is it a property of my being? Is it something that can be accessed by me in first-person? The French philosopher JeanPaul Sartre believed that the “self” is something that only takes part on one’s reflexive experiences, so that in much of one's conscious life (in the so-called pre-reflective experiences) there is nothing that qualifies as an “I” that renders those experiences hers. But if the “self” is only present in reflective experiences, what is it that gives to my prereflective experiences the instantaneous, seemingly intrinsic notion, sensation, or certainty that they are mine? This article makes a brief walkthrough into the intricacies of these questions.

In our work, we intend to present the critique of the "ethics of otherness" to Heidegger's ontology. Under the name of "ethics of otherness" we consider the productions of Emmanuel Lévinas and Enrique Dussel. The first, Jewish-LithuanianFrench, will take the ethical implications of Heidegger's ontology as an opening for his critique proposal. The question that arises is: the Other, the human subject who reveals himself, to the one who understands, also appears on the horizon of the world as a useful entity at hand? Having as central question the relationship between the Same and the Other, we will present the way that Lévinas proposes an absolute otherness, the Other as absolutely Other than the Same, as his critique of ontology. Continuing, we will work the interpretation and the displacement that the Latin-American philosopher Enrique Dussel realizes next to the critic of Lévinas, proposing that Latin America be taken as the Other than the European Totality – without, however, abandoning or denying the ontology.

Philosophical approaches to the notion of personal identity often challenge our ordinary view of the concepts of person and personal identity. I aim to understand how much the name (social feature) can be important for the definition and maintenance of gender identities (psychological feature) and sexual identities (biological feature). I analyze briefly the importance of the concept of proper names for the understanding of personal identity from Saul Kripke's theory of reference. Then I reflect the consequences of this theory within the discussion of personal identity, offering a variant of the paradox of Theseus, in order to problematize some important criteria for the re-identification of individuals. Finally, I present responses to the paradoxes of identifying persons. I conclude by offering some reasons to decline the consequences of the Parftian thesis.

Hume’s project of naturalization of reason is commonly understood by its submission to instinct, that is, he would have defended that there are some principles that reason should not question and should follow, even if their truth is suspicious. This reading distinguishes him clearly from the Cartesians, which claim the self-sufficiency of reason. However, it fails to distinguish him from the fideists, which defend the necessity of faith in virtue of reason’s insufficiency to deal with human matters. The relation between instinct and reason in Hume seems analogous to the relation between faith and reason to the fideists: reason is subdued by a faculty that prescinds fundamentation. That sounds contrary to the spirit of the Enlightenment that his philosophy owns. My aim is to argue that, although Hume agrees with the fideists that reason is unable to justify itself, that does not mean it needs an additional assistance. The natural principles are themselves principles of reason, they constitute it, so they are not an external restriction, but its very healthy mode of functioning. It is its integration, not its submission, to nature that typifies the Humean naturalism.

The text takes off from the considerations on the relation between nature and history in the book Origin of the german tragic drama and this book's interpretation by Adorno on the conference "The idea of natural history", of 1932. Instead of keeping these two concepts as inseparable stable realities, the critical atitude of these two philosophers implicates the concepts' juxtaposition aiming for a subversive comprehension of reality, based more on the decifration and written presentation of philosophical truth in its subjection to history and transience than on its capture as stable and permanent structure in which reality is grounded. In the conclusion that nature no longer exists for humanity, meaning that there is no primary original reality that holds the privilege of the being that must be known, lies the issue of understanding what is produced by history, by modernity, also as a determinant element of the production of nature.

This article aims to demonstrate, from the epistemological thinking of Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962), how the Reason can be discontinuous, provided that the problem about the dynamicity of scientific concepts. Thought has an open structure that makes it dynamic, having the ability to counteract the explanations that claim to be definitive. It is in this sense that the sciences must watch over their historical ancestors and pay attention to the actuality of the problems addressed, in order not to hinder the thinking. From this perspective, the Reason presented by the bachelardian epistemology has a discontinuous history. It is a reason that turns against itself and is constantly reforming, eliminating the obstacles related to concepts sedimented in thought. Reason causes revolutions. She acts by watching, inventing and defending her values insofar as she is contrary to her historical ancestor. Then, Bachelard's thinking highlights an active reason, which, in exercising its creative role, breaks with the forms of immobility. Hence the new rationalism in the contemporary sciences can be understood as a constructive rationalism, because Reason creates new realities and institutes unpublished views on the world.

Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) sought to improve the system initially proposed by René Descartes (1596-1650), despite accepting its premises in epistemology and metaphysics. Thereby, Malebranche proposes to continue the building of a system of truths about knowledge and the ontological constitution of what is known. For both of them, that which is beyond the known objects (as well as of the subject that knows) is absolutely free from doubt. Malebranche recognized that the Cartesian criterion of truth and correction of clarity and distinction (the basis of the Cartesian system) demands a clause, namely that nothingness has no properties. But this clause demands as a condition of truth or validity that the ideas have a divine character, that is, that they are part of God's mind. Occasionalism also constitutes another point that contributes to the exacerbation of the theological character of the Descartes system elaborated by Malebranche. My aim is to describe these modifications, to show how the epistemological building demanded by Descartes could become (presumably, at least) more immune to doubt, through this theologization. To this end, I’ll comment some passages of The Search after Truth and Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion, from Malebranche, and of Meditations on First Philosophy, from Descartes.

This paper aims at approaching the relation between the notion of method and the category of totality on Georg Lukács’ work. We propose to enquiry how this category operates in the argumentative gears of History and Class Consciousness and how it transforms itself and starts to operate in Ontology of Social Being. In History and Class Consciousness the category of totality is taken in two methodological senses, namely the sum of several spheres of life to compose a ‘social totality’ and the process of identity between subject and object. In the Preface to the Second Edition, this category suffers severe review and, in the end, in the Ontology of Social Being it is showed in a reformulated way. The author points out at the Preface that the initial formulation, in the perspective of identity between subject and object of History and Class Consciousness, presented a preponderance of the logical aspect over the ontological one. On the other hand, in Ontology, this category is acting methodologically as an articulator of the teleology and causality categories in order to make us understand the category of labor in its activity of “teleological position” which
is showed as “fundamental ontologic principle”. Totality is also present in the argumentation about the category of social reproduction taken as a “complex of complexes”. We presented the hypothesis that there is a resemblance in the methodological operation that the totality has in Lukacs’ argumentative engineering, whether as the sum of several spheres of life in History and Class Consciousness, as an articulator of teleology and causality categories in the composition of the categorial complex “labor”, or in the comprehension of society as a complex of complexes in Ontology of Social Being, what supports the reading perspective from the idea of a “transformed continuity” of the category in the aforementioned works.

Resumo de "Cegos que julgam as cores", de Voltaire.