MALEBRANCHE E UMA MAIOR GARANTIA EPISTÉMICA PARA O SISTEMA CARTESIANO

Abstract

Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) sought to improve the system initially proposed by René Descartes (1596-1650), despite accepting its premises in epistemology and metaphysics. Thereby, Malebranche proposes to continue the building of a system of truths about knowledge and the ontological constitution of what is known. For both of them, that which is beyond the known objects (as well as of the subject that knows) is absolutely free from doubt. Malebranche recognized that the Cartesian criterion of truth and correction of clarity and distinction (the basis of the Cartesian system) demands a clause, namely that nothingness has no properties. But this clause demands as a condition of truth or validity that the ideas have a divine character, that is, that they are part of God's mind. Occasionalism also constitutes another point that contributes to the exacerbation of the theological character of the Descartes system elaborated by Malebranche. My aim is to describe these modifications, to show how the epistemological building demanded by Descartes could become (presumably, at least) more immune to doubt, through this theologization. To this end, I’ll comment some passages of The Search after Truth and Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion, from Malebranche, and of Meditations on First Philosophy, from Descartes.