Political representation crisis in Brazil

political clientelism and the social rights - a vicious cycle

Abstract

This paper explores how the ineffectiveness of social rights in Brazil perpetuates political clientelism, creating a vicious cycle. In a context where voters rely on immediate benefits due to the lack of a minimum level of social rights realization, their vote for the Legislature does not necessarily reflect their political-ideological preferences, leading to a disconnect between the convictions of the voter and the elected politician. In the legislative sphere, clientelist politicians are not concerned with their own ideals and cast their votes based on political convenience. This is particularly evident in the negotiation between the Legislature and the Executive regarding budget amendments, where legislators use budget control to secure electoral support through pork-barrel practices and, in return, offer support to the government. As a result, clientelist policies become a tool for maintaining power, diverting the focus of politicians, who should instead be dedicating more time, resources, and effort to the development of public policies that could effectively realize social rights. The analysis demonstrates that the relationship between social rights and the qualitative exercise of political rights is central to understanding the strengthening of clientelism, which, in turn, distorts the legislative function, perpetuates socioeconomic inequalities, and weakens democracy by widening the gap between the people as a social entity and the people as an institutional entity.