Volume 2, No. 21º Semestre de 2015

The aim of this paper is to explain how Merleau-Ponty conceives, through the notion of “passive synthesis”, discussed in the chapter on temporality in the book Phenomenology of Perception, subjectivity as temporality itself, while also examining how the author makes this identification between subject and time without rendering the subject a timeless being and without reducing time to a mere product of the subject’s consciousness, that is, by demonstrating how the French philosopher establishes a relationship between the two terms that is never external in nature.

By writing in general terms about the production of art, one of the main objectives of Flusser is to attack a stubborn division of our culture into “two cultures”. According to the author, the artificial separation between science and arts / humanities should be put aside in the interest of a more comprehensive approach to creativity, which means, to the production of ideas, experiences and knowledge. The division between art and science has become deeply rooted in western culture, mostly because it is connected with one of the central goals of our modernity, namely, the capacity of achieving objective knowledge. Of course, science is what has come closer to this ideal of objectivity, and therefore, philosophy, religion, politics and art were disenfranchised as forms of knowledge, for having a small degree of objectivity. As science was transformed into objectivity, the space of subjectivity, of the expression of emotions, remained to be occupied by aesthetics. Flusser argues that objectivity and subjectivity are abstractions in relation to the concrete knowledge, which is always intersubjective. Therefore, under the banner of politics and inter-subjectivity, western culture could solve the atmosphere of absurdity and lack of meaning for life. The restoration of a science informed by art and of an art informed by science, both reconnected with everyday life, could be the key to overcome technocracy.

The artwork, being imaginary, is created from a removal of real, but always presupposes a reality in relation to which it is removal. There is a dialectic between real and unreal in the artwork. Every artist, and even every viewer of the work, put differently the image
according to the concretesituation in which they find themselves. The imaginary work can be put in relation with a world which search to fight for a new society or justify the existent, to exalt the elite or to mock it, forget the everyday problems or try to comprehend a existence which reveals absurd.

This article aims to rethink the role of recognition as the foundation of the social bond.The main references are the third part of Ricoeur’s last work The Course of Recognition and the central section of Marcel Hénaff’s work The Price of the Truth: Gift, Money, and Philosophy on ceremonial gift-giving. The first part of my article focuses on Ricoeur’s critique of modern individualism and on the modern idea of social bond referring to Hobbes’, Hegel’s and Honneth’s speculation. The second section gives an innovative reflection on the social bond, on institutions and on justice. The social bond foundation can be rethought from the ceremonial gift-giving as a charitable giving in which the other is accepted as an irreplaceable partner. Once the bond is settled, there is the hope that it can be pacific and enduring. In this part, I present a personal reflection on Ricoeur seen as a thinker at the margin of the gift. Trust, belief, recognition of human dignity and justice as “complex equality” are the main concepts for a new type of social bond. The possibility of a pacific bond is open but not automatically ensured.

This article analyzes the thematic relevance of the Sublime in the
Critique of Judgment of Kant, in particular the transition of the sublime in nature to the
sublime in art. Kant’s aesthetics is a series of rigorous, subtle observations, but above all
systematic about the Beautiful and the Sublime. The sublime in Kant, from the reading
of Henry Allison, will be taken as a guideline for an investigation of the feeling of
displeasure and pleasure he awakens in the subject that is in front of something
infinitely big.

The current article brings a discussion around the religious conceptions
introduced by Nietzsche in two distinct moments: in his debut book, The Birth of
Tragedy, and in the book written in his last phase of his thought, The Antichrist. We take
as starting point a theological squabble that took place in the nineteenth century, when
theologians were divided between those who had a historical line of interpretation of the
biblical texts, of which Friedrich Schleiermacher and Adolf von Harnack are examples,
and the ones that had an orthodox line guided by a dogmatic key, such as Christian Hermann Weisse. Our goal is to show that in spite of the critical analysis of
Christianism developed in books as The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche leaves open
space for the religious experience, deeming it positively, regarding either the Greek
experience, in his first book, or the involvement with the Gospels, in his The Antichrist
book. Therefore, we support the thesis that Nietzsche holds an important spot in the
philosophy of religion, while we present his arguments in his two mentioned works.

Friedrich Nietzsche develops in the third essay of the Genealogy of
Morals, a controversy with the moral philosophy of Schopenhauer. This, in turn,
underlies the moral of compassion based on a critique of the Kantian philosophy. Some
aspects of this critical movement are analyzed in this paper in light of the critical notion
of the moral traditions.

This present paper studies the idea of “human being” in Nietzsche’s
philosophy and analyzes the relation between the process of self-building and the
project of naturalizing moral, discussed in these writings: Ecce Homo, The Gay Science,
The Wanderer and his Shadow andThus Spoke Zarathustra. This research also proposes
the affirmation of existence through the possibility of the eternal return, understanding
life as a substrate for the creation of new values, according to these papers:The
Dedication to the Art of the Style, by Olímpio Pimenta, andThe Eternal Return in Thus
Spoke Zaratustra, by Brusotti. The problem addressed by Nietzsche reflects that human
and nature are amalgamated by the same Will – symbolized by Dionysus. However,
human is fragmented, unfinished and needs to improve yourself acting at the same time
as an artist and a work of art.

This paper analyzes the free will problem in Nietzsche’s philosophy,
especially in his later writings (1885-1889). I believe that such problem appears in the
form of an antagonism between: (i) the criticism and determinist approach towards the
existence of a freedom to do otherwise in human action; and, (ii) Nietzsche’s use of
positive notions of freedom and responsibility. The issue at stake comes from the
simultaneous statement of (i) and (ii), how can Nietzsche criticize so heavily the
concepts of freedom and responsibility and still use them in his positive agenda?
Nevertheless, inspired in Wolfgang Müller-Lauter methodology, I intent to show that
such antagonism is not essential, but merely an apparent one. It will be seen that Nietzsche’s notion of freedom is compatible with determinism, for it enhances the active
role of the “subject” as a “piece of fatefulness”, being himself at the same time
determined and determining for the whole. When Nietzsche eliminates the separation
between “subject” and world, he dissolves the antagonism between freedom and
determinism, and from such compatibilism arises an interesting notion of “responsible
freedom”, for the “subject” is no longer “the owner” of his actions – as it was under the
freedom to do otherwise paradigm – but is responsible for it, and for its repercussion in
the whole.

The hypothesis of this work is to demonstrate that there is in the text of
Nietzsche what may be called the Sophist Gesture. To legitimize this hypothesis briefly
discuss the "problem" of sophistry as study object to try to move any possibility of
assimilation of sophistry as "philosophical doctrine." This aspect therefore our
methodological scope outlined by the sophistry that we take:sophistic as discursivity.
With the help of interpretation of Barbara Cassin, try to look at two examples of
discourse Nietzsche's text compared to the sophistic discursivity.

This paper aims at an examinationand understandingof the meaning of
Nietzsche’s unpublished note from the summer of 1880which states that “The nihilists
had Schopenhauer as philosopher” (KSA 9.125). According to Nietzsche, the value of
Schopenhauer’s philosophy is precisely to make explicit the nihilistic essence of the
moral interpretation of the world. That’s what makes the philosopher from Danzig a
privileged interlocutor of the nihilists. Nietzsche’s interpretation can be sustained
keeping in view that Schopenhauer is the founder of the pessimism as a philosophical
theme, giving it a metaphysical characterization, regarding to the ultimate essence of the
universe, in a way that he close his system with an evident nihilism.

This article aims at reflecting on some philosophical implications raised by the Robocop movie (directed by José Padilha, 2014). The narrative relights the debate about the boundaries between man and machine, replacing the following question: Where does the machine finishes and the human starts? The purpose of this paper is to situate the position held by the film in the context of the philosophical theories of mind; to evaluate this position from elements of philosophical and scientific tradition available and, finally, to articulate some elements of philosophical relevance that the film raises.

This paper aims to demonstrate the compatibility between the philosophical thought of Feuerbach and the secularization process happened in the western world modern. For Feuerbach, the time, the body and the organic matters constitute the fundamental expressions of man. God is conceived as a projection of human subjectivity and the history is understood as a humanization process of man; the history does not understood as theodicy. In this sense, the anthropological and the secular occupy the space of religious and theological.

Sartre published in 1964 Les Mots,his autobiography in which recalls and examines the whole course of his intellectual development, reflecting on the importance and possibilities of writing and about the writer's situation, reporting how did your passion for reading and writing, watching both as inescapable destiny of every intellectual.On the subject of this study, the proportion of their appreciation to the words, Sartre, when repudiated the values of maternal middle class and has set itself the idea of being a writer, said his atheism and found his refuge in the territory word writing, designing literature as their own emancipation.

When dealing with legal, Kant distinguishes natural law from the law. Natural law has the power to reason and is therefore a priori. He refers to the fair. Positive law relates to the laws positivadas by the legislature. Positive law is the right man for the post. Is situated therefore in space and time. This right arises from the natural law, ie, it must to be linked in the natural and metaphysical laws. Positive law says only what is lawful and unlawful, but never what is just and unjust. Justice is defined only by rational law. The duty can not be defined from the being. This is hang in naturalistic fallacy. Kant avoids both the naturalistic fallacy as a fallacy normativist. Only reason defines what is just and unjust. The empirical law does not.

According to Nietzsche’s statement that metaphysics operates in the
moral sense of denaturalization and spiritualization passions, introducing them to the
state of evil to be combated by institutions universally shared values and controlling the
being and activity – religion, science, philosophy - I will try here to address the
exposure of the metaphysics of the passions produced in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. To do
so, I take as a base, especially the speech "Of joys and passions," to which others also
come to join. Thinking deny the passions in favor of conceptual knowledge
representational – that rationality, consciousness the deified metaphysical truth,
preventing, therefore, research on the value of truth, that is, the elements that, in
addition to what could be the nature of truth underlying the relationship themselves as
creators of their philosophies, they have the truth. The persecution of passions, then, is
the director of metaphysical passion.  Symptom of a dominant drive comes from her orders in, unconscious, emotional, passionate. Contrary to the dualist tradition 
rationalist and subjectivist – the philosophy of Nietzsche equates life and passion,
identifying the engine in the affective dimension of human activity, including thinking
there.

This text aims to relate Hume and Nietzsche from what scholars
minimally admit find points of convergence between these philosophers, namely the
naturalistic approach. To delimit our discussion, we will focus on the theme of morality.
So, we will expose and will comment briefly the ideas defended by some experts: Brian
Leiter, who brings a methodological approach; Peter Kail, who notes a bruising
substantive content included in this methodological id, and Craig Beam, who enters into
the theme of morality and points to similarities also between some of the critical and
positive content of these philosophers. We do not theorize any alleged influence of
Hume on Nietzsche, nor intend to defend a proposal against the other. However, we
believe that a review of the comparison between the two projects contributes to the
broadening and deepening our understanding of them, especially as we stand out
elements that have been ignored even being relevant. In this way, our conclusion points
to a common concern between Hume and Nietzsche with the practical effects of their
respective theories of morality. Despite they distinguish themselves by their specific

targets and strategies, they always appeal to emotions, or calmer or more impulsive, as motivation of human action, keeping their theories confined within the limits of nature.

In this article, we discuss some issues that orbit the theme of morality in
Nietzsche; particularly, in the clash that pervades the relationship: individual - herd,
focusing the problem of the transition between bad and good conscience [schlechtes
Gewissen;gutes Gewissen]. We depict the hypothesis about the process of taming the
animal man and the constitution of a good conscience on morals, accentuating the
embezzlement which constitutes, with the notion of sin, Christian morals. Then, we
approach the theme of the exceptional individuals – particularly, thefree spirit – having
as leitmotiv the practices of deception that pervade his constitution in the midst of
morality, and defending it as a reversion of good conscience in the individual in relationship to what is gregarious. In a third moment, we discuss the problem of
consciousness [Bewusstsein; Bewusstheit] in Nietzsche’s thought, re-evaluating their
potential through processes that, understood as “bad conscience”, allow the transition
between distinct states of good conscience, or innocence. In conclusion, we indicate in
what sense nietzschean’s thought does not imply the defense of individualistic ethics,
but, the need to think the individual under two aspects: as a driver of herds and as
someone who exists between and beyond the hegemony of morality.

The aphorism 341 ofThe Gay Science reveals that Nietzsche's interest by
the ethical effects of the eternal recurrence is deeply attached to the idea that life on
completion of its temporal unfolding will repeat again and again in the same sequence
and order. Thus, the demon hypothesis lead us to the dramatic challenge that involves
the characterization of the eternal recurrence as an ethical doctrine: to want what one
knows. In order to make effective the ethical potential of return it’s not enough to find
theoretical basis to support the idea that life will be repeated in the same sequence and
order, neither scientific proof, you must want this repetition. Therefore,  the crucial
question that Nietzsche forwards to his reader in aphorism 341 ofThe Gay Science is
like living in a way of wanting life repeated eternally in all of its temporal unfolding. In
this context, the aim of this article is to discuss Nietzsche's investment in ethical
ramifications of eternal recurrence and its relation to the stylistic of existence that
emerges from the writings of the philosopher in the end of the second period of his
production.

This paper analyzes the free will problem in Nietzsche’s philosophy,
especially in his later writings (1885-1889). I believe that such problem appears in the
form of an antagonism between: (i) the criticism and determinist approach towards the
existence of a freedom to do otherwise in human action; and, (ii) Nietzsche’s use of
positive notions of freedom and responsibility. The issue at stake comes from the
simultaneous statement of (i) and (ii), how can Nietzsche criticize so heavily the
concepts of freedom and responsibility and still use them in his positive agenda?
Nevertheless, inspired in Wolfgang Müller-Lauter methodology, I intent to show that
such antagonism is not essential, but merely an apparent one. It will be seen that Nietzsche’s notion of freedom is compatible with determinism, for it enhances the active
role of the “subject” as a “piece of fatefulness”, being himself at the same time
determined and determining for the whole. When Nietzsche eliminates the separation
between “subject” and world, he dissolves the antagonism between freedom and
determinism, and from such compatibilism arises an interesting notion of “responsible
freedom”, for the “subject” is no longer “the owner” of his actions – as it was under the
freedom to do otherwise paradigm – but is responsible for it, and for its repercussion in
the whole.

The hypothesis of this work is to demonstrate that there is in the text of
Nietzsche what may be called the Sophist Gesture. To legitimize this hypothesis briefly
discuss the "problem" of sophistry as study object to try to move any possibility of
assimilation of sophistry as "philosophical doctrine." This aspect therefore our
methodological scope outlined by the sophistry that we take:sophistic as discursivity.
With the help of interpretation of Barbara Cassin, try to look at two examples of
discourse Nietzsche's text compared to the sophistic discursivity.