Social security reform and judicialization

the control of constitutionality as a political strategy

Abstract

This article aims to discuss the mobilization of the Supreme Court as a political strategy, evaluating the impact of the judicialization on representativeness. To do so, we analyze the constitutional prerogatives that allow the access of institutions and political actors to the Supreme Court. The study focuses on the case of ADIN 4889, triggered by the PSOL against Constitutional Amendment nº41 / 03, the Social Security Reform promoted in the Lula government. We wanted to highlight how the STF's action in Penal Action 470, which was known as "Mensalão", led to a reorientation of the political strategy, allowing an opposition party to seek to demarcate its position in the political process in the judicial arena. From the methodological point of view, we have resorted to the institutionalism of rational choice as a basis for understanding the strategies adopted by the association. We return to the content of ADIN 4889 and the party's allegation of infringement of the rules of the legislative process. Among the main results we point out that the mobilization of the Courts allows actors and institutions to reverberate their positions in the political game, which implies gains, even electoral ones, because political victories are not necessarily accompanied by judicial successes.