Volume 4, No. 61º Semestre de 2017

This paper aims at clarifying the horizon in which the pragmatic analysis
of Foucault's discourse arises, inserting it in the course of philosophical reflection on
language, as well as its meaning and political potential. For this we will focus on the
following Foucalult’s works: The order of discourse and Archeology of knowledge. This
paper is composed of two parts: in the first part, we will register Foucault in the two major
ruptures in the investigation of language: the Platonic rupture with pre-Socratic thought
and the rupture operated by Saussure in relation to tradition; Then we will clarify the
meaning of Foucault's discourse analysis and how it serves as an emancipatory political
project. Thereby we intend to reissue the invitation that this fascinating philosopher still
addresses to us, which is, the entering into the risky order of discourse that, although it
has been for so long considered by tradition as an enemy to be slaughtered, not only obeys
laws and Regularities that are yet to be discovered, as well as it opens to us a new world
of possibilities.

The central aim of this article is to bring to the fore the debate on the
question of language in the philosophy of Henri Bergson. To do so, we will trace our
route from the notorious establishment of the difference in nature between space and time
and the consequent recognition of the two spheres of subjectivity. In presenting the
problem of dualism in subjectivity and the split between consciousness and the object,
Bergson has as focus of his discussion the difficulty of abstract and spatial language in
apprehend the reality of the duration of our deepest self.

Through the Theory of Self, in articulation with the contributions of
psychoanalysis and the anti-capitalist scrutiny of Deleuze and Guattari, the article depicts
an ontological-gestaltic view over the subject which, otherwise conceived as structured,
has had the primacy of its rationality dethroned by the revolutions of thought of the 20th
century. By means of dynamics which are similar to Deleuze’s notion of ritornello, the
Self establishes bonds with the Other during the process of contact; as a late effect, these
experiences are registered linguistically and conceptually in a way that produces totalities
of meaning to which it can identify. What is produced is something that might be named
as Personality, which operates as a function of becoming and not a fixed structure, with
the exception of the cases in which it arbitrarily crystallizes as a means to avoid contact.

The article demonstrates the possible equivalence relationship between
platonic love and the meaning of the commonly used slang crush among teenagers.
Nonetheless, the equivalence proved to be false, since the object of Platonic Love,
according to the understanding presented of Plato's Symposium, differs from the object of
desire expressed in the mark crush. However, despite differing in the end, the crush is
likely to be understood as the initial step in the ascending process in relation to true love.
It is based on crush in its correlation with the contemporary social and cultural context,
in this end, it uses authors like Pierre Lévy, Ernst Cassirer, Zygmunt Bauman and Alasdair
MacIntyre, juxtaposing, whenever possible and necessary, to determinant aspects of the
Platonic philosophy in correspondence to the proposed theme. In addition to having a
brief introduction and final considerations, a single section was chosen, contributing to
the qualitative study of the theme. In addition, the study reaffirms the usefulness of
philosophy as consisting of highly contributory knowledge in rigorous, critical and plural
thinking about the different expressions that characterize the contemporary way of being,
particularly in relation to the way of being of the young adolescent immersed in a world
increasingly multicultural, global and interrelated within a network.

This paper discusses the concept of metaphorical possible and its
developments in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Firstly, I show the main aspects of
what means “to be possible” in Aquinas’ philosophical system, by considering the
thomasic opera as a whole. Secondly, I locate the metaphorical possible in the divisions
of being possible, by analyzing the elements given by the philosopher in order to define
the concept. In the paper, specially at the end, I suggest some questions to be developed
by colleagues and other scholars, based on the discussion started.

 This paper aims to observe the occurrence of terms that say participation
in steps 130b and 130e of Plato's Parmenides in order to distinguish two conceptions
poorly explained in the studies of Platonic ontology: a sense of changeable participation,
which an entity can begin to partake in a Form and get a predicate and another sense of
eternal participation in which a participant eternally possesses a predicate (eg: three is
always odd), respectively associated with the terms μεταλαμβάνοντα and μετέχοντα. This
distinction becomes clearer in 155e and can be found elsewhere in the Platonic dialogues,
as for example in the Phaedo

The purpose of this article is to compare the foucaultian interpretation of
cynicism with the Nietzsche’s critique of culture and his project of transvaluation of
values. From an anecdote on Diogenes, the cynic, Foucault develops his hypotheses about
the true cynical life, starting from the imperative to change the value of the currency. In
this task, the relation that the author establishes between currency, values and norms is
crucial, since cynicism effectively assumes a certain position against conventions,
diametrically averse to social habits and customs. There would be in cynicism a
destructive impulse to conventions, and dominant cultural routes established for and by
the collectivity. Thus the cynical life would express a way of living, transfiguring
conventional values and lifestyles. I therefore believe there is a fertile closeness between
these conceptions and Nietzsche's philosophical positioning, his critique of culture, and
the affirmation of a revaluation of values.

In this article we intended to recompose the argument that sustains the
critic of Leibniz the notion of Newtonian space tota simul, in order to show that, according
to the Leibnizian presupposition, the real immediate cause of the movement should live
in the true notion of substance or Monad and no, as it defended Newton, in the notion of
a space totally similar and undiscernible. According to the German philosopher, the
notion of a space that possesses reality per se would be implicated in the impossibility of
the correct characterization of movement of the bodies, position that this notion would
violate the principles of sufficient reason and of the identity of the undiscernible. In this
sense, the foundation of movement would not be in the existence of an absolute space,
but in the intrinsic registration of the change and of the movement for the individualized
apperception of the Monad

The present article aims to show how the Teutonic American political
philosopher Leo Strauss tries by means of a reflection on the historical phenomenon of
the tyranny, to develop a greater understanding of the advent of the totalitarianisms of the
twentieth century, what the philosopher came to call "tyranny of our times". Thus,
Strauss's effort here is to trace a kind of reading about, or an inquiry into, what are, so to
speak, the intellectual roots of totalitarian regimes and, above all, of Nazism.

The present work performs an historical and philosophical analysis of the
theme “care of the self” through the prism of its practices by the most representative
figures of the Greek world, starting from pre-philosophical period until Plato,
demonstrating how the practices of the care represents an ordained way of life and, more,
represents the thinking and the acting of an illustrious time of the History and the Greek
Philosophy. At last, this work presents the philosophical apex of the theme care in ancient
times personified by Socrates as portrayed by Platonic dialogues

Considering the concepts of boredom, divertissement, self forgetfulness
and self-love, this text intends to show how the search of the self for happiness leads to a
fundamental problem, that of the self in front of its creator. It is argued here that the
human condition, as Pascal understands it, is crucial to thinking about the question of
human subjectivity. Thus, the purpose of the text is highlight the tensions between
boredom and subjectivity.

The present article is intended to superficially expose some
epistemological advances on the use of the method to reach a scientific truth, considering
the punctual perspectives of Descartes, Bacon and Hobbes throughout modernity. Both
the method proposed by René Descartes (1596-1650) and Francis Bacon (1561-1625)
aimed primarily at guiding the proper use of reason and senses in epistemological
processes. From the good use of reason, in the Cartesian case, and both in the case of the
Baconian, we obtain solid foundations for the investigation of truths, especially those that
correspond to science. With Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes (1558-1679) we will see
advances in the epistemological use of the method, yet still insufficient to deal with what
we will call the "problem of epistemic space." However, we will try to argue that the
greatest innovations about the epistemological use of the method were actually made by
Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) in his Ideography. From this, we will demonstrate how we
can consider Fregean conception as a kind of "continuity" of the Cartesian method.

he text approaches some deployments about the fundamental question
“what is time?”. There will be contemplated: 1) The interpretation of Jeanne Marie
Gagnebin about the book XI of Confessions, by Augustine, presented in the work Sete
aulas sobre linguagem, memória e história; 2) Three Jorge Luis Borges’ lectures related
to this theme, entitled “O livro”, “O tempo” and “A imortalidade”, inserted in Cinco
visões pessoais; 3) The ideas presented in the essay of Giorgio Agamben, entitled “O que
é contemporâneo?”; 4) one conference of Martin Heidegger, called “O conceito do
tempo”.

The aim of this paper is to show how Descartes worked out his
mechanistic philosophy. So the first step to reach this goal led Descartes to criticize and
abandon the notion of ‘substantial form’, which was largely employed by the schoolmen
to explain all events concerning natural beings in a qualitative way. Having discharged
the substantial form, the next step was to establish a new subject-matter for natural
philosophy, which he found in the material body (res extensa) and its geometrical
properties. From these modifications introduced by Descartes will also emerge a new
method of investigating natural phenomena based on mathematical measurement and
precision, more commited with a ‘Platonic epistemology’ than with an ‘Aristotelic one’.
We will conclude by asserting that Descartes was in agreement with many of his
contemporaries, most notably Bacon and Galileo, thinkers who were engaged in
fighting against the formalistic philosophy of Aristotle. Together with them Descartes
has given his contribuition for the renovation of the western philosophy.